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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 14, 1873, Myra Bradwell reprinted a short article from the 
St. Louis Republican in the Chicago Legal News announcing the U.S. 
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∗ Ph.D., J.D., Visiting Assistant Professor Northern Illinois University, former J. Willard Hurst 
Legal History Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School.  The author wishes to thank Arthur 
McEvoy, Jane Larson, Eric Arnesen, David Kyvig, James Schmidt, Susan Levine, Katrin 
Schultheiss, Felice Batlan, Barbara Babcock, Barbara Welke, Dan Hamilton, Elizabeth Mertz, 
Stuart Macaulay, Mitra Sharfi, Laura Singleton, Risa L. Lieberwitz, Marianne Constable, Rima 
Schultz, the participants of the Northern Illinois University History Brownbag Series, the University 
of Wisconsin Socio-Legal Studies Brownbag, the UW Institute for Legal Studies Fellows 
Colloquium, and the Chicago Bar Association Alliance for Women. 
1
Jordan: "Horror of a Woman"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
13-JORDAN.DOC 6/30/2009  4:12 PM 
1202 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1201 
Supreme Court’s decision in her case.1  The article glossed over the 
import of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the new Fourteenth 
Amendment and focused instead on the Illinois court’s underlying 
decision to deny women the right to practice law.2  The piece had a 
pejorative tone because, three years earlier when Bradwell filed her 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Missouri had become the second state 
to grant a woman a license to practice law.3  By the time the Supreme 
Court rendered its decision in April 1873, five states and the District of 
Columbia had admitted women to their bars.4  The St. Louis Republican, 
a Democratic newspaper, readily chided its northern neighbor: 
It seems very hard for some of the Republican States to learn a simple 
lesson in that liberality which they pretend to teach to others.  Women, 
qualified for the vocation, are admitted to the bar in Missouri, without 
let or hindrance, and no shock to our social system has come of the 
practice.  But the Republicans of Illinois appear to have the same 
horror of a woman that an old-fashioned Democrat once had of a 
negro.5 
This short article reveals an important insight that challenges some 
contemporary interpretations of Bradwell v. Illinois.  First, it points out 
what we know, but sometimes overlook, that the Supreme Court holding 
in Bradwell did not prevent women from becoming lawyers or practicing 
law.6  More importantly, however, it suggests that Justice Bradley’s oft-
cited concurrence – where he reveals his horror of a woman, writing that 
“[t]he harmony, not to say identity, of interest and views which belong, 
or should belong, to the family institution is repugnant to the idea of a 
woman adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her 
husband”7 – that this opinion was perhaps not the dominant ideology of 
the day.  Looking beyond the Supreme Court opinions, this paper 
attempts to assess what Bradwell v. Illinois meant to Myra Bradwell and 
the women’s rights movement. 
 
 1. CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 14, 1873, at 454 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision to 
uphold the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision to deny Myra Bradwell’s law license application). 
 2. Id. 
 3. A Woman Admitted to the Bar in Missouri, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 3, 1870, at 212. 
 4. KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638 
TO THE PRESENT 37-38 (1986) (Iowa, Missouri, Michigan, Maine, and Utah). 
 5. CHI. LEGAL NEWS, supra note 1, at 454. 
 6. Frances Olsen, From False Paternalism to False Equality: Judicial Assaults on Feminist 
Community, Illinois 1869-1895, 84 MICH. L. REV 1518, 1529 (1986); MORELLO, supra note 4, at 
21-22. 
 7. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
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Many scholars have well and thoroughly analyzed both Justice 
Miller’s majority opinion and Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion.8 
Richard Aynes even crafted a hypothetical opinion for Chief Justice 
Chase, the sole dissenter in the case, as Chase died before he was able to 
write his own opinion.9  Additionally, almost every constitutional law 
casebook includes at least a note discussing the case.10  The note 
typically follows or cites Slaughter-House Cases and describes Bradwell 
as the second nail in the coffin of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
Privileges and Immunities Clause.11  They explain that in Bradwell, 
Justice Miller reiterated the majority’s holding from its holding in 
Slaughter-House Cases that the Clause only protected the privileges and 
immunities of national citizenship and that the right to work in one’s 
chosen profession was not one of those privileges.12 
Most casebooks also include Bradwell as representative of the 
Court’s support for the ideology of separate spheres.13  This concept 
divided social roles based on gender, preserving the public domain for 
men and relegating women to the private, domestic sphere.14  This 
 
 8. Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Female Citizenship and the 
American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 229, 260-61 (1989); JOAN HOFF, LAW, 
GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN (1991); Nancy T. Gilliam, A 
Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell’s Fight to Practice Law, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 105 (1987); 
Olsen, supra note 6, at 1527-29; DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION 
AND THE LAW 21-22 (1989); WILLIAM WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT:  LAW AND IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886-1937, at 150 (1998); 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY VOLUME 1836-1918, at 550 (1935); 4 CHARLES 
FAIRMAN, THE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
UNITED STATES: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864-88, at 1364-68 (1971). 
 9. Richard L. Aynes, Bradwell v. Illinois: Chief Justice Chase’s Dissent and the “Sphere of 
Women’s Work”, 59 LA. L. REV. 521, 537-38 (1999). 
 10. See, e.g., JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 827 (6th ed. 
2000); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: HISTORY, CASES, 
AND PHILOSOPHY 1179 (2d ed. 2004); KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 648 (4th ed. 2001). 
 11. See, e.g., NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 827; KMIEC ET AL., supra note 10, at 
1179; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 10, at 648. 
 12. See supra note 11. 
 13. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 622 (5th ed. 2005); KMIEC 
ET AL., supra note 10, at 1399; SULLIVAN & GUNTHER supra note 10, at 648; WALTER F. MURPHY 
ET AL., AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 744 (1986) (citing the decision in Bradwell 
as part of the Court’s “judicial indifference to the rights of persons who were not white males”).  
See also Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and Suffrage 
Militance in the 1870s, in VISIBLE WOMEN: NEW ESSAYS ON AMERICAN ACTIVISM 30 (Nancy A. 
Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock eds., 1993); JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER: 
THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL 21 (1993). 
 14. For discussions of the concept of separate spheres, see Barbara Welter, The Cult of True 
Womanhood: 1820-1860, 18 AM. Q. 151 (1966); NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD:  
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interpretation of Bradwell cites Justice Bradley’s infamous concurrence 
where he, perhaps too vociferously, espoused support for the “wide 
difference in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman” 
and revealed his horror of a woman who acted outside of her sphere.15  
These casebooks suggest, I believe mistakenly, that Bradley’s 
perspective represented the dominant gender ideology that endured into 
the twentieth century.16 
The most progressive casebooks and a number of additional legal 
scholars place Bradwell v. Illinois, I believe correctly, within the 
women’s rights movement.17  Myra Bradwell was among the women’s 
rights activists that immediately perceived the potential of the new 
Fourteenth Amendment to emancipate women.18  She used her case to 
make a claim on the Amendment, hoping to secure an interpretation that 
its provisions granted women full citizenship rights, privileges, and 
obligations and ensured them due process and equal protection of the 
law.19  These accounts agree with the traditional assessment that the 
majority opinion in Bradwell reaffirmed the Court’s interpretation of the 
privileges and immunities clause, but by contextualizing the case within 
the women’s rights movement, they suggest that Bradwell and other 
women’s rights activists were involved in an assault on the separate 
spheres doctrine that was gaining some support.20  This context also 
allows us to see the connection between Myra Bradwell, Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton, Susan B. Anthony, and Virginia Minor and the strategy they 
pursued to use the Fourteenth Amendment to bring women into the 
public sphere as full and equal citizens.21 
 
“WOMAN’S SPHERE” IN NEW ENGLAND, 1730-1835 (1977); Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, The Female 
World of Love and Ritual: Relations between Women in Nineteenth-Century America, 1 SIGNS 1 
(1975). 
 15. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 16. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 10, at 827-28 (“The views quoted here [by Justice 
Bradley] were representative of the attitudes women met when they attempted to challenge sex-
based classifications.”); see also DuBois, supra note 13, at 30. 
 17. PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 1179-80 (5th ed. 2006); LOUIS FISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 945-54 (3d 
ed. 1999); DuBois, supra note 13, at 30; Gilliam, supra note 8, at 115. 
 18. BREST ET AL., supra note 17, at 1180; DuBois, supra note 13, at 30; Gilliam, supra note 8, 
at 115. 
 19. The XIV Amendment and Our Case, 5 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1873, at 354. 
 20. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
 21. BREST et al., supra note 17, at 1179-80; FISHER, supra note 17, at 946-48.  For a 
discussion of Virginia Minor and her case, Minor v. Happersett, see DuBois, supra note 13, at 22. 
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Bradwell was a leader in the Illinois women’s rights movement.22  
She initiated her case at a time when the women’s rights movement was 
beginning to divide over the issue of woman suffrage and the Fifteenth 
Amendment.23  I contend that Bradwell was not part of that divide, but 
rather represented a third faction of the women’s rights movement that 
pursued a comprehensive strategy of securing women’s legal equality 
through affirmative rights claims.24  Bradwell and her followers 
maintained this strategy as the splintering factions narrowed their focus 
to securing woman suffrage and later abandoned what Ellen Carol 
DuBois described as their original “democratic vision.”25  Bradwell 
never chose sides in the fight between the National Woman Suffrage 
Association, led by Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and 
the American Woman Suffrage Association, led by Lucy Stone and Julia 
Ward Howe.26  Instead, she held fast to her democratic vision, 
maintained relationships with both groups, and developed her arguments 
in concert with those activists who were intent on establishing that the 
Fourteenth Amendment granted women full and equal citizenship rights, 
privileges, and obligations.27 
I argue that through her case Myra Bradwell developed two legal 
innovations that would be invoked by other rights activists through the 
remainder of the nineteenth century and throughout much of the 
twentieth century, albeit sometimes in opposition to each other.  The 
first was an argument that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment should be applied to women.28  The second was the 
 
 22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 11; Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, 28 AM. L. REV. 278 
(1894); Myra Bradwell 26 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 17, 1894, at 200-02. 
 23. See ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, FEMINISM AND SUFFRAGE: THE EMERGENCE OF AN 
INDEPENDENT WOMEN’S MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 1848-1869, at 162-202 (1978) (describing the 
first split in the women’s rights movement, which occurred in 1869, over whether to support the 
Fifteenth Amendment that granted suffrage to African-American men, but not to women). 
 24. I develop this argument more fully in Agents of (Incremental) Change: From Myra 
Bradwell to Hillary Clinton, NEV. L.J. (forthcoming). 
 25. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21.  Anthony and Stanton held onto their democratic vision 
longer than the leaders of the AWSA, but by 1890 when the NWSA merged with the AWSA to 
become the NAWSA the leaders had also narrowed their focus and dropped their attacks on separate 
spheres.  MARY BECKER, CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN & MORRISON TORREY, CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 10-11 (1994). 
 26. ELEANOR FLEXNER & ELLEN FITZPATRICK, CENTURY OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 145-46 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996) (1959). 
 27. See infra Part I. 
 28. See Gilliam, supra note 8, at 115 (arguing that Bradwell’s “fourteenth amendment 
argument was based on equality” and that her “perception of the issue was generations ahead of her 
time”).  It was an adaptation of the New Departure arguments set forth by Francis Minor and 
adopted by many suffragists.  See infra note 152. 
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introduction of a new form of legal interpretation that set forth the 
foundations of what would later be called sociological jurisprudence.29  
As elite lawyers and justices were advocating an ideology that William 
Wiecek has labeled “legal classicism,” which was based on the notion 
that the legal order was an “autonomous, determinate, natural, neutral, 
necessary, objective, and apolitical structure of principles and norms,”30 
Bradwell was adapting the ideology of instrumentalism to the cause of 
women’s rights, crafting what I will call pre-sociological jurisprudence 
arguments.31 
To support these claims, Part II situates Bradwell firmly within the 
women’s rights movement and asserts that she intended her case to 
advance women’s rights beyond opening the legal profession to women.  
Part III sets forth the arguments Bradwell presented in support of her 
application for a law license to the Illinois Supreme Court.  It 
demonstrates how Bradwell developed a line of legal reasoning that 
drew on the principles of instrumentalism but transformed its goal to one 
of social justice.  It describes how Bradwell asked the court to view the 
law within a broad social context, to consider the changing social and 
economic circumstances when interpreting the law, and to apply the law 
in a manner that would secure social justice.  It further asserts that 
Bradwell’s claim of sex discrimination was based, in part, on the Equal 
Protection Clause of the new Fourteenth Amendment.  Part IV sets forth 
some of the responses by the public and those in the legal community 
that supported Bradwell and other women’s rights activists making 
similar claims.  These popular responses were critical of the majority 
opinion and the endorsement of separate spheres articulated in Justice 
 
 29. Sociological jurisprudence is philosophy that the law be viewed “within a broad social 
context rather than as an isolated phenomenon” and that “legislation and court adjudications 
[should] take into account the findings of other branches of learning, particularly the social 
sciences.”  Justice William O. Douglas, Jurisprudence, Microsoft® Encarta® Online Encyclopedia 
(2008), available at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761558172/Jurisprudence.html. 
 30. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 3, 175, 177-80; see Robert W. Gordon, Legal Thought and 
Legal Practice in the Age of American Enterprise 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL 
IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA 70 (Gerald L. Geison ed., 1983) (arguing that elite lawyers during this 
time fought against an instrumental approach to law and advocated instead a scientific, formalist 
approach); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE 
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 3, 109-42 (1992); KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 223 (1989). 
 31. The term sociological jurisprudence was coined by Roscoe Pound in the first decade of 
the twentieth century. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93.  Bradwell and the others who developed 
these arguments in the nineteenth century did not give it a name.  For purposes of this article, I will 
refer to these early arguments as “pre-sociological jurisprudence.”  For a discussion of 
instrumentalism see HALL, supra note 30, at 106; WIECEK, supra note 8, at 44. 
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Bradley’s concurrence.  It argues that these criticisms cast doubt on the 
notion that the separate spheres doctrine was as widely and uncritically 
accepted as Justice Bradley implied. 
The article concludes with an assessment that this is not a story of 
grand victory.  Women did and continue to face discrimination within 
the legal profession and society.32  The obstacles were and are even 
greater for women of color.33  But there have been incremental advances. 
Bradwell was ultimately admitted to both the Illinois and the Supreme 
Court bars.34  By 1950 every state in the Union admitted women 
lawyers.35  In 1971 the Supreme Court began using the Equal Protection 
Clause to strike down sex discrimination.36  In 1981 the first woman 
Justice was appointed to the United States Supreme Court.37  This article 
suggests that the tools Myra Bradwell crafted in concert with other mid-
nineteenth century women activists served as an important foundation 
for the incremental advances women secured over the subsequent one 
hundred and fifty years. 
II.  MYRA BRADWELL AS A LEADER IN THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
Myra Colby Bradwell was a rights activist her entire life.  Like 
many of the women activists of her generation, she was raised as an 
abolitionist.38  She was also among the first cohort of women who were 
able to take advantage of the opportunity to study in the seminaries and 
colleges that were newly opened to women.39  In 1852, at age twenty-
 
 32. See generally Smith, supra note 8; see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON 
WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: OVERCOMING THE SISYPHUS FACTOR (1995); 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, CHARTING OUR PROGRESS: 
THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION TODAY 4 (2006). 
 33. JANET E. GANS EPNER, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON WOMEN IN THE 
PROFESSION, VISIBLE INVISIBILITY: WOMEN OF COLOR IN LAW FIRMS (2006). 
 34. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 30 (stating that Bradwell refused to reapply for her license, 
but when she was dying of cancer, her husband convinced the Illinois Supreme Court to admit her 
based on her original motion; Bradwell was admitted to the bar in Illinois in 1890 and to the 
Supreme Court in 1892, two years before her death). 
 35. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
 36. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971); BECKER, supra note 25, at 25. 
 37. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 218. 
 38. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 35; 1 THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS 277 (John Palmer 
ed., 1899); Death of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 278. 
 39. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 35-36 (stating that Bradwell first attended female seminary 
in Kenosha, Wisconsin and then, in 1851, studied at the newly established Elgin Seminary); Myra 
Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200.  For a discussion of nineteenth century female seminaries in the 
Midwest, see STEPHEN M. BUECHLER, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE WOMAN SUFFRAGE 
MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF ILLINOIS, 1850-1920, at 58 (1986); see also KAREN J. BLAIR, THE 
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one, she married fellow abolitionist and lawyer James Bradwell.40  When 
her husband opened his first law office in Chicago in 1855, Myra 
Bradwell assisted him in his practice. 41  Within a few years, she 
determined to become a lawyer herself: “I came to find out that a woman 
could accomplish as much labor in the same lines as a man, and 
therefore,” Bradwell explained, “I concluded to read law.”42 
 
CLUBWOMAN AS FEMINIST: TRUE WOMANHOOD REDEFINED 1868-1914, at 8-9 (1980).  For a 
broader discussion of the development of female seminaries see BARBARA MILLER SOLOMON, IN 
THE COMPANY OF EDUCATED WOMEN: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA 14-26 (1985). 
 40. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200.  James Bradwell studied at the soundly abolitionist 
Knox College in Galesburg, Illinois.  HERMAN KOGAN, THE FIRST CENTURY: THE CHICAGO BAR 
ASSOCIATION, 1874-1974, at 24 (1974).  Reverend George Washington Gale, the founder of Knox 
College, organized an antislavery society in Knox County within five months of the college’s 
incorporation.  HERMANN R. MUELDER, MISSIONARIES AND MUCKRAKERS: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS OF KNOX COLLEGE 6 (1984).  Elijah Lovejoy published the call to establish this society in 
his antislavery paper the Observer – an act that led to his murder.  Id.  Though there was 
tremendous support for the Society among Gale and the new settlers who worked at Knox College, 
proslavery advocates attacked and killed Lovejoy ten days after the society was founded.  Id.  The 
founders and supporters of Knox College nonetheless remained steadfast in their antislavery 
position and their abolition activities, including having the president of the college attend the 1843 
World Anti-Slavery Convention in London.  Id. at 10. 
 41. Most accounts chronologize that James Bradwell and Myra Colby married in Illinois in 
1852, subsequently moved to Memphis for two years where they operated a private school, and 
returned to Illinois in 1854 or 1855.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 41; Caroline K. Goddard, 
Bradwell, Myra Colby, in WOMEN BUILDING CHICAGO 1790-1990: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 
112 (Rima Lunin Schultz & Adele Hast eds., 2001); 1 Dorothy Thomas, Bradwell, Myra Colby, in 
NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 223 (Edward T. James ed., 
1971); Kogan, supra note 40, at 24; DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 580-81; George 
W. Gale, Myra Bradwell: The First Woman Lawyer, 39 A.B.A. J. 1080 (1953); Gilliam, supra note 
8, at 106 (stating that the couple married in Tennessee).  Most accounts also agree that James 
Bradwell was admitted to the Illinois bar in 1855 and opened a law office that year.  FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 13, at 41 (stating that James Bradwell was also admitted to the Tennessee bar); Goddard, 
supra, at 112; Thomas, supra, at 223; DICTIONARY OF THE AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY, supra, at 580.  
Some accounts cite that James Bradwell opened his Chicago law office in partnership with Myra’s 
brother, Frank Colby.  FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 41; Goddard, supra, at 112; Thomas, supra, at 
223.  See also Obituary. Eben F. Colby, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 16, 1884, at 391 (describing that 
Colby was Myra’s brother and that he and James Bradwell maintained the law firm of Bradwell and 
Colby for several years).  Most state that Myra Bradwell began to assist her husband in his law 
practice and then, sometime after that but before 1868 began to study the law herself.  FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 13, at 41; Thomas, supra, at 224; Kogan, supra note 40, at 24-25; Gilliam, supra note 8, 
at 106; Gale, supra, at 1080. Goddard, supra, at 112. In response to a newspaper reporter’s 
interview questions, James Bradwell recollected that he was admitted to the Illinois bar and opened 
an office in Chicago in 1853.  All Dabble in the Law, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 12, 1889, at 26; see 
also 1 FREDERIC B. CROSSLEY, COURTS AND LAWYERS OF ILLINOIS 263 (1916) (asserting that 
James Bradwell returned to Chicago, was admitted to the Illinois bar and opened a law practice in 
1853). 
 42. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41.  In this interview Myra Bradwell dates the 
beginning of her formal legal studies at 1857: “about five years after our marriage I determined to 
read [law] in good earnest.”  Id. 
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Bradwell interrupted her studies during the Civil War to join other 
northern reform women in active support of the Union Army.43  She was 
president of the Soldiers’ Aid Society, one of the organizations that 
provided medical services and supplies to wounded soldiers and relief to 
their families.44  She also was an officer in the Northwestern Sanitary 
Commission, established to assist in maintaining hygienic field hospitals 
and camps, and she worked diligently in the production of 1863 and 
1867 Northwestern Sanitary Fairs that raised money for the Union 
Army.45  Through these activities Bradwell and the other Commission 
activists learned how to establish and lead organizations to advance a 
cause.46  After the war, she began her fight for women’s rights in 
earnest. 
Bradwell’s first step was to establish a legal newspaper for lawyers 
and judges that prominently featured legal issues relating to women.47  
Because some of the laws of coverture still applied,48 Bradwell 
petitioned the Illinois legislature for a special charter that allowed her to 
enter into contracts necessary for her to own and operate her own 
business.49  In October 1868, Bradwell founded the Chicago Legal 
News, the city’s only weekly legal newspaper.50  Within five months the 
 
 43. Thomas, supra note 41, at 223. 
 44. Id. at 224. 
 45. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 201; see also Mrs. Mary A. Livermore, 16 CHI. LEGAL 
NEWS, Jan. 26, 1884, at 166 (where Bradwell describes the fairs and praises Mary Livermore for her 
leadership role).  The Northwestern Sanitary Fairs were one of many local sanitary fairs that raised 
money for the Union Army.  THE BENCH AND BAR OF ILLINOIS, supra note 38, at 278.  For 
descriptions of the Sanitary Commissions see FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 100-01; 2 
BESSIE LOUISE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO: FROM TOWN TO CITY, 1848-1871, at 453, 455 
(1940); KATHLEEN D. MCCARTHY, NOBLESSE OBLIGE: CHARITY AND CULTURAL PHILANTHROPY 
IN CHICAGO, 1849-1929, at 34-35 (1982); MARY A. LIVERMORE, MY STORY OF THE WAR: A 
WOMAN’S NARRATIVE OF FOUR YEARS PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AS NURSE IN THE UNION ARMY, 
AND IN RELIEF WORK AT HOME, IN HOSPITALS, CAMPS, AND AT THE FRONT, DURING THE WAR OF 
THE REBELLION 411-56 (1889). 
 46. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 59. 
 47. Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200; Goddard, supra note 41, at 113; FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 13, at 77-78. 
 48. The doctrine of coverture tied women’s legal status to her marital or kin relationships.  A 
married woman was thought to become one with her husband, a union that effectively rendered her 
civilly dead.  See NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW:  WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY 
IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 17-19, 20-24 (1982); Linda E. Speth, The Married Women’s 
Property Acts, 1839-1865: Reform, Reactions, or Revolution?, in WOMEN AND THE LAW: A SOCIAL 
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE VOLUME II: PROPERTY, FAMILY AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 69-70 (D. 
Kelly Weisberg ed., 1982); Carole Shammas, Re-Assessing the Married Women’s Property Acts, 6 
J. WOMEN’S HIST. 9, 10 (1994); SANDRA F. VANBURKLEO, “BELONGING TO THE WORLD”: 
WOMEN’S RIGHTS AND AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE 108-10 (2001). 
 49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 77. 
 50. Id.; Myra Bradwell, supra note 22, at 200. 
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Illinois legislature granted the paper a special charter to immediately 
publish all new laws passed at the end of each legislative session.51  It 
also deemed that the paper’s publication of those laws was proper 
evidence of their content in court and that the paper was a sufficient 
method of publication of legal notices.52  The paper quickly became an 
important resource for lawyers and earned praise from lawyers and 
judges in Chicago and across the country.53 
Bradwell published the Chicago Legal News for a year before she 
applied for her law license.  During that year she became one of the 
leaders of the women’s rights movement in Illinois and utilized her 
paper, with its large male readership, as one of her primary tools to 
advance the cause.  Bradwell filled the Legal News with articles on the 
professional and political activities of women, prominently chronicling 
women’s participation in the legal profession.54  She also advocated for a 
number of women’s rights law reforms, including woman suffrage and 
property rights.55  One of her first successful legislative campaigns, 
which she conducted largely within the pages of the Chicago Legal 
News, was to secure the enactment of Illinois’ second Married Woman’s 
Property Act. 
In 1865 the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled that the state’s first 
Married Women’s Property Act, passed in 1861, failed to grant women 
the right to own and control their own wages.56  By the 1870s there was 
a national movement to pass Married Women’s Property Acts.57  Like 
Illinois, many state legislatures and courts maintained that a married 
women’s wages were not her separate property and therefore were not 
covered by the Acts.58  They maintained that under the doctrine of 
coverture, these wages belonged to the husband.59  Women’s rights 
 
 51. The Laws of 1869, 1 CHI. LEGAL NEWS 188 (Mar. 13, 1869); Myra Bradwell, supra note 
22, at 200; FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 79. 
 52. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 79. 
 53. 6 INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO: THE BENCH AND BAR 642 (1896); Goddard, supra note 41, at 
113; The Myra Bradwell Case, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Apr. 20, 1873, at 8 (describing the Chicago Legal 
News as “the best law-newspaper in the country”). 
 54. For example, in one of her first issues Bradwell reported that Mary E. Magoon was 
practicing law in the lower courts in North English, Iowa (where a law license was not required). 
Female Lawyer, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172. 
 55. INDUSTRIAL CHICAGO, supra note 53, at 642; FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 78. 
 56. Bear v. Hays, 36 Ill. 280, 281 (1865). 
 57. BASCH, supra note 48, at 136-37; HOFF, supra note 8, at 127-31.  For a discussion of the 
movement for Married Women’s Property Acts before 1870, see Speth, supra note 48. 
 58. AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, MARRIAGE, AND 
THE MARKET IN THE AGE OF SLAVE EMANCIPATION 197-200 (1998). 
 59. Id. 
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activists were engaged in a campaign to change these laws and Bradwell 
led the charge in Illinois.60  During the paper’s first year Bradwell 
flooded the News with articles imploring the Illinois legislature to pass a 
second act that would deem women’s wages to be their sole and separate 
property and even travelled to Springfield to lobby for the bill in 
person.61  She relentlessly pursued the matter until the legislature finally 
acquiesced with a second act in March 1869.62 
During this time, Bradwell also participated in organizing the 
Illinois Woman’s Suffrage Association (IWSA) and found herself in the 
middle of a fight among the leaders of the national suffrage movement.63  
The IWSA was one of two woman suffrage organizations established in 
Illinois in February 1869.64  Bradwell was elected an officer in the 
IWSA and her position brought her into contact with Susan B. Anthony 
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton, two of the national leaders who both 
attended and addressed the IWSA’s founding convention.65  Bradwell 
and her husband were among those elected as representatives of the 
IWSA to attend the National Equal Rights Association Convention held 
three months later in May 1869.66  Bradwell again interacted with 
Stanton and Anthony at the Equal Rights convention, but like many of 
the attendees, disagreed with their decision to oppose the Fifteenth 
Amendment if women were not included.67  This disagreement led to a 
well-studied split among the woman suffrage activists. Susan B. 
Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton led the dissenting faction and 
 
 60. Id. at 176-77, 201-03. 
 61. See Husband and Wife – Property of Latter Under Law of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS 22 
(Oct. 17, 1868) (specifying the inequalities that persisted in the Illinois property laws).  Law 
Relating to Women, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 31, 1868, at 37; CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 9, 1869, at 117 
(informing readers that New Hampshire passed a married earning act and asserting: “We hope, 
before the adjournment of the present legislature, they will have that right in Illinois.”); Talk with 
the Legislature, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172; Married Women’s Separate Property 
Under Act of 1861, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 13, 1869, at 53. 
 62. An Act in Relation to the Earnings of Married Women, LAWS OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 
ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 255 (1869).  The law was approved March 24, 1869.  It 
established that married women’s wages were their sole and separate property, but specified that the 
act did not give a wife “any right to compensation from any labor performed for her minor children 
or husband.” 
 63. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 68-75. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id at 70-71. 
 66. Kate Doggett, Rev. E.J. Goodspeed, and Rebecca Mott were also elected to attend the 
ERA convention.  Chicago Woman Suffrage Convention, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 20, 1869, at 164; 
BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 71. 
 67. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 70-71.  See DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 162-202 (describing 
the first split in the women’s rights movement, which occurred in 1869, over whether to support the 
Fifteenth Amendment that granted black suffrage to African-American men, but not to women). 
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established the National Woman Suffrage Association (NWSA) as an 
independent woman suffrage organization.68  Lucy Stone, her husband 
Henry Blackwell, and Julia Ward Howe responded by establishing the 
American Woman Suffrage Association (AWSA).69 
Bradwell refused to take sides in the split.  She  was part of the 
coalition in the IWSA that kept the Illinois association neutral in the 
national fight during its first two years.70  Bradwell served on the 
executive committee of the IWSA and hosted its meetings in the 
Chicago Legal News offices.71  She was elected, along with her husband, 
and a number of others, to attend the AWSA’s first convention in 
Cleveland in November 1869.72  But the delegates’ relationship with the 
AWSA was qualified. They were bound by a resolution, adopted 
unanimously by the IWSA executive committee, which required them to 
maintain a neutral position in the fight between the national suffrage 
factions: 
Resolved, That the delegates elected to the National Convention be 
requested not to identify themselves with any division that may exist 
among prominent workers in the cause in other parts of the country, or 
to participate in any action intended as antagonistic to any existing 
Woman’s Suffrage organization.73 
The delegates abided by their resolution.  When Susan B. Anthony 
appeared at the hall in Cleveland, James Bradwell urged the leaders of 
the AWSA to allow her to sit on the platform and address the 
convention.74  Myra Bradwell was elected one of two Secretaries for the 
AWSA,75 but the IWSA did not affiliate with the association and 
Bradwell did not agree to exclusive membership. At the first meeting of 
the IWSA executive committee after the convention, the delegates 
acknowledged the animosity that existed between the leaders of the two 
national organizations and expressed their desire to “promote harmony 
in the furtherance of the great object sought to be attached by both 
 
 68. See DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 195. 
 69. Id. 
 70. DUBOIS, supra note 23, at 198-99. 
 71. Woman’s Suffrage. Election of Delegates to the National Convention at Cleveland, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 14, 1869, at 1. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. 2 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY: 
AGAINST AN ARISTOCRACY OF SEX: 1866 TO 1873, at 284 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 2000) (hereinafter 
PAPERS). 
 75. Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1869, at 1;  BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 86. 
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sections.”76  They discussed the possibility of forming a Northwestern 
Suffrage Association as a means of bringing the other two factions 
together77 and then passed a second resolution that reiterated the IWSA’s 
neutrality: 
Resolved, That while we sympathize with the objects had in view in 
the formation of the National Woman Suffrage Associations formed in 
Cleveland and New York, we will not become auxiliary to either, until 
the difficulties between the two are settled.78 
The IWSA preserved its middle position for another fifteen months.  
During that time, the IWSA steadfastly urged the two national 
associations to merge.79  It even persuaded both Susan B. Anthony and 
Lucy Stone to come to a meeting in Chicago in November 1870 to 
“review the contest.”80  But the IWSA suffered its own division six 
months later that caused the Bradwells and five other officers to 
withdraw from the association and allowed Stanton and Anthony 
sympathizers to take over the IWSA in April 1871.81  The Bradwells, 
nonetheless, maintained their neutral position. 
The fracture in the IWSA occurred over issues of religion and 
divorce.  Bradwell and those who withdrew opposed the practice of “free 
divorce”82 and were offended by a pamphlet written by Alonzo J. 
 
 76. Woman’s Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 5, 1870, at 4. 
 77. Id.  Some members of the committee who were also members of the Cook County 
Woman Suffrage Association (CCWSA) did act on the idea of a Northwestern Suffrage 
Association.  Five months after the meeting the CCWSA published an initial call for a meeting in 
Chicago for anyone interested in the possibility of forming a Northwestern association.  Female 
Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., May 19, 1870, at 1.  A Northwestern Association was established on May 25, 
1870, but it appears that it was sympathetic to Susan B. Anthony and the NWSA and not neutral.  
See Woman Suffrage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1870, at 5; Woman’s Suffrage Convention of the 
Northwestern Franchise Association, CHI. TRIB., May 26, 1870, at 3. 
 78. Woman’s Suffrage, supra note 76.  
 79. The Woman Suffrage Associations – Illinois Advocates Urge Union, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 
1870, at 2; Woman Suffrage, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 1870, at 3. 
 80. Woman Suffrage, supra note 79. 
 81. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3; BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 104. 
 82. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3.  The term “free divorce” was used interchangeably with “easy divorce” 
and often in connection with the concept of “free love.”  Free-Love and Free-Divorce, EVERY 
SATURDAY: A JOURNAL OF CHOICE READING, July 22, 1871, at 75; War in the Woman Suffrage 
Camp. Mrs. Henry H. Stanton. Free Divorce and Free Love, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 13, 1870, at 2; Taking 
the Back-Track, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 14, 1872, at 5; Judge Farwell on Divorce, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 22, 
1872, at 4; Woman and Easy Divorce, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 28, 1871, at 4.  It was also called 
“freedom of divorce.” Editorial Article, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 27, 1871, at 2; see also STANLEY, supra 
note 58 at 178.  Free love embraced the concept of women’s sexuality and advocated that women 
had the right to decline sexual intercourse.  BARBARA GOLDSMITH, OTHER POWERS: THE AGE OF 
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Grover, which was published by the Executive Committee of the Cook 
County Woman’s Suffrage Association (CCWSA), that challenged the 
authority of the Bible.83  The CCWSA was established in April 1870 as 
an independent suffrage association, but many of its members, including 
Grover and Catharine and Charles Waite, were members of both the 
CCWSA and the IWSA.84  Catharine Waite and Jane Graham Jones, the 
primary leaders of the CCWSA during its first years, both sympathized 
with Susan B. Anthony.85  In 1871, just before the division occurred, and 
 
SUFFRAGE, SPIRITUALISM, AND THE SCANDALOUS VICTORIA WOODHULL, 208 (1998).  Opponents 
to free love described it as “free lust.”  Editorial Article 2, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 14, 1870, at 2.  Free 
divorce referred to state laws that broadened the grounds under which either or both the husband 
and wife could sue for divorce.  (See for example Free Trade in Divorce, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 
1872, at 4, that describes a proposed bill in New York that would have allowed divorce on the 
grounds that one of the parties was “unhappy or uncomfortable.”)  Those who opposed divorce 
except on the grounds of adultery or extreme cruelty criticized these laws, arguing that they 
destroyed the institution of marriage that they insisted was the “foundations of the social order.”  
Divorces in Illinois, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 23, 1873, at 6; The World of Amusement, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 29, 
1871, at 2 (arguing that “divorce[] made easy…makes a farce of marriage . . . kills the home . . . 
dissevers the family . . . [and] is an outrage upon the child”).  See also NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC 
VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 106-111 (2000).  Proponents of liberal divorce 
laws, which included Elizabeth Cady Stanton, argued that denying divorce to women denied their 
liberty and caused harm to the family.  “Woman’s Right” to Divorce NEW YORK TIMES May 18, 
1870 at 2; NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY 
GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 68-69 (1999). 
 83. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3; A.J. GROVER, THE BIBLE ARGUMENT AGAINST WOMAN STATED AND 
ANSWERED FROM A BIBLE STANDPOINT (1870).  Charles Waite similarly challenged Christianity.  
Waite, a self described free thinker, wrote a book which he described as a comprehensive view of 
the gospels of the first two centuries.  CHARLES B. WAITE, HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION 
TO THE YEAR TWO HUNDRED, at iii-iv (3d ed. 1881).  It necessarily challenged the Bible as it 
included what he described as the lost gospels of that time.  Id. at 1-15 (Chapter 1, “The Lost 
Gospels of the First Century”).  The book was published by his wife, Catharine Van Valkenburg 
Waite’s, publishing company.  Id. at title page.  Elizabeth Cady Stanton shared the position of 
Grover and Waite that Christianity and the Bible had a deleterious effect on the position of women.  
ELLEN CAROL DUBOIS, The Limitations of Sisterhood: Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Division in the 
American Suffrage Movement, 1875-1902, in WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 160, 163-
64.  In 1895, after almost a decade of work, she published the Woman’s Bible.  Id. at 164-65 and 
170. 
 84. Woman’s Suffrage: Organization of the Cook County Women’s Franchise Association, 
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 6, 1870, at 3; Cook County Organization for Woman Suffrage Formed, THE 
REVOLUTION 253 (Apr. 21, 1870).  Fernando Jones served as the temporary first chair and 
Catharine Waite served as secretary.  Charles Waite was also a member of the association.  Jane 
Graham Jones, wife of Fernando Jones, was subsequently elected as chair and served as president 
from 1870 to 1876.  From its beginning the association supported Susan B. Anthony.  3 HISTORY OF 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE 589 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joselyn Gage eds., 
1886); Woman’s Suffrage: Meeting of the County Franchise Association, CHI. TRIB., May 15, 1870, 
at 3. 
 85. Woman Suffrage: First Annual Convention of the Cook County Woman Suffrage 
Association: Resolutions Offered that Woman is Already Entitled to the Franchise, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 
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perhaps one of the acts that precipitated it, Catharine Waite was elected 
the new president of the IWSA. 86 
The defection was well orchestrated and dramatic.  James Bradwell, 
as chair of the IWSA executive committee, called a meeting of the 
committee for April 18, 1871.87  Neither he nor his wife attended the 
meeting, but Elizabeth Babbit did.88  Babbit read a paper signed by the 
dissenters, declaring their withdrawal from the organization and 
explaining that their decision was based on principle.89  They cited 
Grover’s pamphlet and accused Waite and other members on the 
committee who were also members of the CCWSA of attempting to 
“force us into a union with said association, which published and 
officially endorsed a pamphlet which treats the Bible as a collection of 
fables . . . [and] its principal speakers are those known to the public as 
advocates of free divorce.”90  Bradwell, who at this point was already 
being accused of trying to destroy the family because of her attempts to 
become a lawyer, could not be associated with this publication or 
position.91  She and the others left and the IWSA fell firmly in the hands 
of NWSA supporters.92 
Myra Bradwell remained committed to securing women’s legal 
equality, including woman suffrage, and therefore maintained a 
relationship with Catharine Waite and both factions of the fighting 
national leaders.  It appears that she and her husband had true affection 
 
11, 1871, at 3; Woman Suffrage: Reception to Mrs. Stanton and Miss Anthony: The Former 
Addresses a Few Words to Her Friend, CHI. TRIB., June 9, 1871, at 4; see also 3 THE SELECTED 
PAPERS OF ELIZABETH CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY 152, 153 n.5 (Ann D. Gordon ed., 
2003) (reprinting a letter from Anthony to Elizabeth Boynton Harbert urging Harbert to become 
President of the IWSA to replace Jones, who had moved to Europe and could no longer lead the 
NWSA; with Jones gone, Anthony feared the AWSA sympathizers within the IWSA might take 
control of the state association). 
 86. BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 104. 
 87. Female Suffrage: Meeting of the Executive Committee of the Illinois Association, CHI. 
TRIB., Apr. 19, 1871, at 3. 
 88. See id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. See infra notes 105-108 and accompanying text. 
 92. Jane Graham Jones succeeded Waite as President of the IWSA.  BUECHLER, supra note 
39, at 104.  Jones was also committed to Anthony.  See 3 THE SELECTED PAPERS OF ELIZABETH 
CADY STANTON AND SUSAN B. ANTHONY, supra note 85, at 152.  There is some evidence that some 
of those who left the IWSA started their own suffrage association called the Christian Suffrage 
Society, but it does not appear that this society endured for long.  See Current Topics, EVERY 
SATURDAY: A JOURNAL OF CHOICE READING, May 27, 1871, at 483; Christian Suffrage Society, 
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 26, 1871, at 2.  It is not known whether either of the Bradwells was associated with 
this society. 
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for Lucy Stone.93  Although their personal relationships may have been 
more strained, Bradwell also maintained a working relationship and 
displayed significant respect for Catharine Waite, Susan B. Anthony, 
and Elizabeth Cady Stanton.94  Like Anthony and Stanton, Bradwell was 
fighting for more than suffrage.  In a poem she read to the Illinois Press 
Association shortly after she left the IWSA, Bradwell outlined her law 
reform agenda. It included securing and advancing women’s right to: 
education, work, contract, guardianship, property, inheritance, and 
physical protection from a drunken or violent husband.95  Bradwell was 
in the middle of her fight to secure her law license and open the 
professions to women when she delivered this poem - a fight she waged 
with the assistance of Waite, Stanton, Anthony, and a number of other 
women’s rights activists. 
The fight began just after Bradwell had secured the second Illinois 
Married Women’s Property Act and in the midst of her suffrage activism 
with the IWSA (before the dissension).  She closely followed the events 
in the neighboring state of Iowa where, in June 1869, Arabella 
Mansfield had become the first woman to secure a state license to 
practice law.96  Mansfield had studied law for two years in her brother's 
law office.97  Judge Francis Springer, known for his support of the 
woman’s rights movement, had encouraged Mansfield to apply for her 
license.98  Although the Iowa law regulating the licensing of attorneys to 
the bar restricted admission to “white male persons,”99 Springer admitted 
 
 93. Bradwell also used the Chicago Legal News presses to serve as the Woman’s Journal’s 
western agent, publishing the paper every Saturday.  The Woman’s Journal, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 
15, 1870, at 124.  Lucy Stone, Mary Livermore, and Julia Ward Howe, all leaders of the AWSA, 
were the editors of the Journal.  Id. 
 94. Before the split, Bradwell met with Elizabeth Cady Stanton in Springfield, Illinois in late 
February 1869 and described her as one of the “great apostles” of the woman suffrage movement.  
Suffrage and Springfield, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 27, 1869, at 172.  She met with Susan B. 
Anthony in Chicago in March, 1870.  Susan B. Anthony, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 12, 1870, at 188.  
She described the encounter as “a very pleasant visit” and published her full support for Anthony’s 
proposed sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution.  Id.  After Bradwell left the IWSA she attended 
at least two national meetings of the NWSA.  See Washington, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Dec. 1872, at 2; 
The Women, CHI. DAILY TRIB., May 7, 1879, at 3.  Bradwell and Anthony also exchanged a handful 
of letters from 1873 to 1888 that reflected their continued, albeit strained, relationship.  FRIEDMAN, 
supra note 13, at 184-89. 
 95. Mrs. Bradwell’s Poem, CHI. TRIB., July 2, 1871, at 2. 
 96. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 11. 
 97. Louis A. Haselmayer, Belle A. Mansfield, 55 WOMEN LAWYERS J. 46 (1969); Dorothy 
Thomas, Arabella Mansfield, in NOTABLE AMERICAN WOMEN 1607-1950: A BIOGRAPHICAL 
DICTIONARY 492, 493 (Edward T. James ed., 1971). 
 98. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 493. 
 99. Haselmayer, supra note 97, at 47. 
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Mansfield to the bar, making her the first licensed woman lawyer in the 
country.100  Bradwell prominently celebrated Mansfield’s admission in 
the Chicago Legal News.101  Myra Bradwell applied for her Illinois law 
license three months later, in September 1869.102  She applied in part 
because she wanted to practice law, but Bradwell also applied to 
advance the broader cause of women’s rights.103 
III.  BRADWELL’S CASE AS A STRATEGY IN THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
Bradwell’s application and subsequent lawsuit were part of her 
lifelong fight to secure women’s legal equality.  Bradwell was not a 
radical. She believed in liberal individualism, Christianity, and 
marriage.104  What she denounced was the concept of separate spheres 
and the laws, doctrines, and social practices that limited women’s 
citizenship rights.  That is why twenty years after she first filed her 
application, she was still angry at those who had openly questioned her 
ability to be a lawyer because she was a woman and chastised her for 
attempting to leave her rightful place as wife and mother.105  “All the 
wiseacres of the land,” she explained, “made doleful prophecies 
concerning the end of my career . . .  [and] predicted that I’d wreck my 
family and break my hearthstone to smithereens.”106  Two decades later 
it was still important to her to prove them wrong:  “I often wish all those 
excellent folk who used to picture me as a fanatic destroyer of 
domesticity and the sweetness of true womanhood could see my two 
 
 100. Mansfield used her legal expertise to advance the women’s rights movement in Iowa.  
Haselmayer, supra note 97, at 49 (quoting a letter from John Mansfield published in the IOWA 
CLASSIC, Dec. 1872, at 17).  In August of 1870 she drafted a “Constitution for the Henry County 
Woman Suffrage Association.”  Id.  She continued to teach as well as give various lectures on legal 
issues such as “The Principles of Government” and “The Origin of Law” and furthered her legal 
education at Iowa Wesleyan University receiving her Bachelor of Laws degree in June 1872.  Id.  In 
1872-73 she studied English, Hindu, and Muslim law in London and Paris.  Id.  At the first national 
meeting of women lawyers that occurred at the Isabella Clubhouse in Chicago during the World's 
Fair of 1893, Mansfield gave an address on her admission to the bar and was given an honorary 
membership to the National League of Women Lawyers founded during the Fair.  Id. 
 101. A Married Woman Admitted to the Bar in Iowa, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Oct. 16, 1869, at 20. 
 102. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 
1870, at 145.  Bradwell received her certification of examination from Judge E.S. Williams on 
August 2, 1869.  Id. 
 103. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41. 
 104. Friedman, supra note 13, at 37. 
 105. See id. at 40. 
 106. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41; Friedman, supra note 13, at 40. 
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daughters and our homelife.”107  Bradwell had never fought against 
marriage or motherhood, but she had always argued that being a wife 
and mother should not limit a woman’s citizenship status or be a barrier 
to a woman working in her chosen profession.108  Bradwell wanted equal 
rights, not revolution.  
A.  Bradwell’s Equal Protection Argument and Her Contribution 
Toward the Development of Sociological Jurisprudence 
Bradwell ultimately lost her case, but by her own assessment, her 
efforts helped to dismantle the doctrine of separate spheres and her legal 
arguments were an important contribution to the women’s rights 
movement.109  These arguments and her innovation in jurisprudence 
were all set forth in her case at the state level.110  She developed them in 
concert with other women’s rights activists as the case progressed.  
Bradwell filed three briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court in support of 
her application for a license to practice law.  Each one offered 
increasingly sophisticated arguments that incorporated and developed 
the contemporaneous events and arguments set forth by other women’s 
rights activists. 
The first brief accompanied her initial application.111  The brief was 
not required by statute but Bradwell submitted it along with the required 
documents, a certificate of legal study and proof of successful 
completion of the state bar examination.  Because she was the first 
woman to apply for a license in the state, Bradwell wanted to reassure 
the justices that her application was legally proper.  She stated simply 
that she met the statutory requirements and therefore her sex should not 
prohibit her from entering her chosen profession.  She acknowledged 
that the governing statute used the male pronoun in its recitation of 
requirements to enter the bar, but argued that it was not an explicit 
requirement that the applicant be male.112  She cited as evidence the 
 
 107. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41.  Bradwell was referring to her daughter Bessie 
Bradwell Helmer, an attorney, and her daughter-in law, Hattie Burton Bradwell.  Bessie and Hattie 
were close friends in school.  Id.  Both women lived with their husbands, Frank Helmer and Thomas 
Bradwell, both attorneys, in James and Myra Bradwell’s home in Chicago.  Id. 
 108. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 37; see Aynes, supra note 9, at 536. 
 109. All Dabble in the Law, supra note 41 (“The world, too, has begun to learn the lesson that 
it is not necessary for a woman to break up all family ties and sacrifice womanly attributes and 
graces in order to succeed in other trades than the honored one of housewife.”) (quoting Myra 
Bradwell). 
 110. See In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869). 
 111. See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145. 
 112. Bradwell quotes the Illinois law as: 
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Illinois statute that specified “[w]hen any party or person is described or 
referred to by words importing the masculine gender, females as well as 
males shall be deemed to be included.”113  Bradwell also cited other 
examples in the statutes where the court would have to interpret the male 
pronoun “he” to include women to avoid an absurd result.114 
It was in Bradwell’s second brief that she began to invoke 
arguments that included what would become tenets of sociological 
jurisprudence.115  She wrote this brief in response to the Illinois court’s 
initial denial of her application.116  The decision came in a short letter 
sent by the court reporter, stating that the court denied her application 
based on the laws of coverture.117  She used new statutes, other court 
decisions, examples of women’s social progress, and her own special 
situation to argue that the laws of coverture no longer applied.118  She 
asserted that in light of these changes the court must reconsider and 
grant her application.119 
Bradwell first asked the judges to consider the new laws and court 
decisions that granted women property rights as a changed circumstance 
that should affect their interpretation of the law governing law 
licenses.120  Bradwell insisted that the two Illinois Married Women's 
Property Acts, passed in 1861 and 1869 that allowed women to enter 
into contracts and own their own wages, invalidated the rule of 
 
No person shall be permitted to practice as an attorney or counselor-at-law, or to 
commence, conduct or defend any action, suit or plaint, in which he is not a party 
concerned, in any court of record within his State, either by using or subscribing his own 
name or the name of any other person without having previously obtained a license for 
that purpose from some two of the Justices of the Supreme Court, which license shall 
constitute the person receiving the same an attorney and counselor-at-law, and shall 
authorize him to appear in all courts of record within this state, and there to practice as 
an attorney and counselor-at law, according to the laws and customs thereof . . . . 
A Woman Cannot Practice Law, supra note 102, at 145. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Adam Winkler describes these arguments as “living constitutionalism.”  Adam Winkler, A 
Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suffragists and the “Living Constitution,” 76 N.Y.U.  L. REV. 1456, 
1463 (2001) (explaining that Living Constitutionalism requires that the Constitution must be 
interpreted “in light of society’s changing needs and conditions rather than solely the Framers’ 
intent”); BENJAMIN  N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROCESS 82-83 (1921). 
 116. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145. 
 117. The letter from the Supreme Court Reporter was dated October 6, 1869.  Id.  Bradwell 
filed her second brief on November 18, 1869.  Id. 
 118. Id. at 145-46. 
 119. Id. at 146. 
 120. Id. at 145-46. 
19
Jordan: "Horror of a Woman"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
13-JORDAN.DOC 6/30/2009  4:12 PM 
1220 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1201 
coverture.121  She also cited a number of court decisions in Illinois, other 
states, and in England, which she contended were precedents that 
supported the changed legal and social position of married women, 
specifically the condition that women could contract and engage in 
business dealing.122  Bradwell also reminded the court that the Illinois 
legislature had granted her a special charter to own and operate the 
Chicago Legal News.123  These arguments, using new statutes and court 
decisions as persuasive precedents to illustrate changed social and legal 
circumstances, became a common strategy of sociological jurisprudence 
in the twentieth century.124 
Bradwell next asked the justices to consider the current social 
conditions when interpreting the Illinois licensing statute.  She set forth 
these changes by describing the many advances women had made in 
public life: 
The doors of many of our universities and law schools are now open to 
women upon an equality with men.  The Government of the United 
States has employed women in many of its departments, and appointed 
many, both single and married, to office.  Almost every large city in 
the Union has its regularly admitted female physicians. . . .  The bar 
itself is not without its women lawyers, both single and married.125 
Bradwell then described the details of Arabella Mansfield’s law license 
application and Judge Springer’s interpretation that the use of the word 
“male” in the Iowa statute was “not an implied denial of the right to 
females.”126  Bradwell offered both Mansfield’s admission and 
Springer’s interpretation of the Iowa statute as precedent-setting changes 
in the social and legal position of women and asked the court to interpret 
and apply the Illinois law to her case in line with these changes.127 
Bradwell developed her argument by drawing on the strategies of 
instrumentalism that had developed during the antebellum period and 
were being challenged by legal classicists.  Legal classicism was the 
 
 121. Id. at 146; Olsen, supra note 6, at 1524.  Bradwell also argued that for her in particular, 
coverture was not a barrier to her ability to engage in business transactions since the Illinois 
legislature had granted her a special charter to operate the Chicago Legal News. 
 122. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 145-46. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1481, 1482 n.141. 
 125. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.  
However, at this time Iowan Mansfield, a married woman, was the only woman admitted to any 
state bar in the United States. 
 126. Id. at 146. 
 127. Id. 
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form of judicial interpretation that believed the Constitution was based 
on “concepts and principles [that] were static and unchanging” and 
required judges to interpret the Constitution based on the original intent 
of those who drafted and enacted it.128 Legal classicism opposed the 
early nineteenth century practice of  some state court judges who had 
used the law to advance economic policies that supported 
entrepreneurial growth and expansion, interpreting the laws in light of 
the current social and economic circumstances.129  In opposition to legal 
classicism, Bradwell invoked the strategy of the instrumentalists, but 
transformed their ends from supporting a Hurstian release of energy130 to 
advance a nascent notion of social justice.131  She urged the court not to 
enforce some outdated common law doctrine or to interpret a statute 
from the perspective of those who enacted it , but rather to interpret the 
law in light of the changed social conditions of women and grant her a 
license to practice law “as a matter of right and justice.”132 
The connection between Bradwell’s arguments and instrumentalism 
is explicit in her brief.  She specifically invoked the words of the 
instrumentalist, English jurist, Lord Mansfield, citing a case where 
Mansfield had ruled that regardless of the prescriptions of common law 
there were exceptions when a married woman could contract and be 
sued.133   Lord Mansfield intended his decision to advance the free 
market, not woman’s rights, but Bradwell contended that his decision 
also supported the contention that the law must adapt to the changing 
social circumstances of women’s position.134  As evidence she quoted 
Mansfield’s assessment that when “the reason of the law [ceased], the 
law itself must cease; and that, as the usages of society alter, the law 
 
 128. Morton J. Horowitz, Transformation of Constitutional Law, in 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2712 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); Paul W. 
Kahn, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
32-64 (1992); Winkler, supra note 115, at 1463; WIECEK supra note 8, at 19. 
 129. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 44; see also MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 178-80 (1977); William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery 
Movement Upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
513, 521-24 (1974). 
 130. J. WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-
CENTURY UNITED STATES (1956).  Hurst argued that in the United States in the nineteenth century, 
men used the law affirmatively “to promote the greater release of individual or group energies” to 
advance material and economic growth.  Id. at 7. 
 131. I am indebted to James Schmidt for helping to develop this insight into social justice. 
 132. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
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must adapt itself to the various situations of mankind.”135  Bradwell 
merely changed the goal of the instrumentalist approach from economic 
expansion to her gendered justice. 
These pre-sociological jurisprudence arguments are echoed in the 
arguments of Justices and legal scholars credited with developing 
concepts of sociological jurisprudence, legal realism, and living 
constitutionalism.136  In the last two decades of the nineteenth century, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, (who some call the father of legal realism) 
published treatises challenging the notion of legal interpretation as 
objective and detached from social realities.137  In the first decade of the 
twentieth century, Roscoe Pound conceived the term “sociological 
jurisprudence,” issued a call for “pragmatism as a philosophy of law,”138 
and advocated the concept that the law should be used to achieve social 
justice.139  In the 1920s, Benjamin Cardozo advocated living 
constitutionalism, explaining that the “content of constitutional 
immunities is not constant, but varies from age to age.”140  Although 
none of these men referenced Bradwell, their writings developed the 
arguments she set forth in her second brief to the Illinois Supreme Court 
in November 1869. 
Bradwell did not cultivate this reasoning on her own.  She worked 
in consultation with other women’s rights activists who were also 
employing this approach in attempts to influence the interpretation of 
various state laws and the new U.S. Constitutional amendments.141  
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See infra notes 137-140 and accompanying text. 
 137. See HORWITZ, supra note 30, at 3, 109-10, 142; HALL, supra note 30, at 223.  See Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897). 
 138. WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93.  See Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 
COLUM. L. REV. 605, 609 (1908). 
 139. See Pound, supra note 138; see generally Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological 
Jurisprudence, in 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907); see also WIECEK, supra note 8, at 191-93. 
 140. CARDOZO, supra note 115, at 82-83. 
 141. Although there are no known correspondences between Bradwell and Stanton specifically 
discussing this argument of judicial interpretation, there is evidence that the two women interacted 
during this period and there is a letter Anthony wrote to Bradwell in 1873 after her prosecution for 
voting in which she asks Bradwell “What are we going to do or say next?” and writes “How I would 
love to talk of our Constitutional position and work for the future.”  FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 
184 (letter from Anthony to Bradwell dated July 30, 1873).  This letter was written after Bradwell 
withdrew from the IWSA.  It offers the possibility that Bradwell and Anthony had previously talked 
about their constitutional arguments.  This possibility is supported by the similarities in the 
arguments of Bradwell, Stanton, and Minor three years earlier, before the splintering of the IWSA.  
Further, Anthony published an article on October 7, 1869 announcing that Bradwell was about to 
apply for her law license.  What Women are Doing, THE REVOLUTION 218 (Oct. 7 1869).  Bradwell 
had just submitted the application in October and just received the letter from the Court Reporter 
denying her application.  Bradwell had not yet published this information in the Chicago Legal 
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Adam Winkler has identified that the New Departure strategy of women 
suffragists included arguments that the Constitution was a living 
document and that it be interpreted in light of the changed social and 
political circumstances.142  According to Winkler, Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton publicly articulated this position in January 1870 while 
testifying before the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia.  She 
was arguing in favor of a petition to grant women suffrage.143 
Stanton’s arguments, like Bradwell’s, described democracy and law 
as evolutionary.144  She first claimed that the underlying principles of the 
Constitution required that its provisions apply to all its citizens.145  She 
then offered examples of the changed social and legal circumstances of 
women and argued that these changes required that the legislature grant 
women the right to vote.146  Specifically, she cited the recent Supreme 
Court decision that held that when a foreign born woman married a man 
born in the United States, she became a citizen.147  Stanton reasoned that 
this means a woman born in the United State is already a citizen and 
therefore entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.148  
Although, like Bradwell, her arguments did not persuade her audience to 
grant the demand she sought, her arguments were important to the 
movement. 
Both Bradwell and Stanton also supplemented their pre-
sociological arguments with a textual interpretation argument that 
Stanton described as the New Departure.149  Ellen Carol DuBois credits 
Frances and Virginia Minor with the origins of the New Departure 
argument, which asserted that women were already enfranchised 
because the right to vote was one of the privileges and immunities of 
U.S. citizens protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.150  The Minors 
first publicly articulated this argument in the form of six resolutions at a 
 
News.  Bradwell submitted her second brief to the Illinois Supreme Court on November 16, 1869, 
but she did not publish copy of it until February 5, 1870.  See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or 
Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.  Stanton made her argument to the Senate 
Committee on the District of Columbia in January 1870.  Winkler, supra note 115, at 1479. 
 142. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1457-58, 1479. 
 143. Id. at 1479. 
 144. Id. at 1480, 1483; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 407-520 (Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joselyn Gage eds., 1881). 
 145. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1480. 
 146. Id. at 1480-81. 
 147. See Kelly v. Owen, 74 U.S. 496 (1868). 
 148. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 412; see Kelly, 74 U.S. at 496. 
 149. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1476. 
 150. DuBois, supra note 13, at 21-22. 
23
Jordan: "Horror of a Woman"
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
13-JORDAN.DOC 6/30/2009  4:12 PM 
1224 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:1201 
state suffrage convention held on October 6 and 7, 1869 in Missouri.151  
Three weeks later, on October 28, 1869, Anthony published their 
resolutions in The Revolution and delivered ten thousand copies to 
activists and politicians throughout the country.152 
Myra Bradwell drew on their argument and adapted it for use in her 
own case.153  On December 31, 1869 she submitted her third and final 
brief to the Illinois Supreme Court, this time resting a woman’s right to 
practice law on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article Four and 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.154  Unlike the Minors, and the argument 
her attorney would make on her appeal, Bradwell did not make a claim 
based on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.155  Rather, she asserted that the denial of her application on 
the basis of her status as a married woman violated her United States 
citizenship rights established by the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the 1866 Civil Rights Act.156  Like Minor, 
she argued that the court should employ a broad interpretation of the 
new laws.157 
In her brief, Bradwell drew heavily on both the Equal Protection 
Clause and the Civil Rights Act.158  She argued that the Act guaranteed 
all United States citizens the “full and equal benefit of all laws and 
proceedings for the security of persons and property.”159  Bradwell 
asserted both the Act and the Equal Protection Clause granted her “the 
right to exercise and follow the profession of an attorney-at-law upon the 
same terms, conditions and restrictions as are applied to and imposed 
upon every other citizen of the State of Illinois and none other.”160  
 
 151. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 407-10. 
 152. PAPERS, supra note 74, at 273-75; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1476-77; 2 HISTORY OF 
WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 411.  Although Minor’s argument did not include the new 
method of constitutional interpretation that included consideration of changed social circumstance, 
it did call for a broad interpretation of the Constitution and it included a plea for justice.  Dear 
Revolution (Letter by Francis Minor), THE REVOLUTION (Oct. 21, 1869); PAPERS, supra note 74, at 
275 (“That justice and equity can only be attained by having the same laws for men and women 
alike.” (Francis Minor to the Revolution, Resolution 5, Oct. 14, 1869)).  Suffragists quickly seized 
on the New Departure argument and put it into practice by demanding the vote.  DUBOIS, supra note 
23, at 117-18. 
 153. DuBois, supra note 13, at 30. 
 154. See Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114. 
 155. Bradwell filed the second brief on January 2, 1870.  A Woman Cannot Practice Law or 
Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146.  Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114. 
 156. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 114. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See notes 154 and 156 and accompanying text. 
 159. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 146. 
 160. Id. 
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Bradwell reasoned that because she complied with all of the state 
requirements for admission to the bar, “it is contrary to the true intent 
and meaning of said amendment and said ‘Civil Rights Bill,’ for your 
petitioner to be refused a license to practice law, upon the sole ground of 
her ‘married condition.’”161  Although she rested her case on alternate 
constitutional and legal provisions, her argument followed the New 
Departure reasoning.162 
She also made a claim based on the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourth Article of the Constitution, again asking the court 
to employ a broad interpretation of that clause.163  She submitted an 
affidavit attesting that she was born in Vermont and argued she was 
therefore a citizen of that state and the United States.164  She asserted 
that under this Article as a citizen of another state, Illinois was required 
to grant her all the privileges and immunities of a United States 
citizen.165  She then listed her assessment of what rights were included in 
the privileges and immunities of citizenship, a list dramatically different 
than the one the U.S. Supreme Court would construct in its interpretation 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
on her appeal.166  Bradwell’s list included general rights, like “the 
protection of the Government, the right to the enjoyment of life and 
liberty, [and] to reside in the State.”167  It also included rights that she 
had spent much of her adult life fighting to ensure were extended to 
women, including the right “to acquire and possess property,” and “to 
carry on trade,” and her immediate fight “to follow any professional 
pursuit under the laws of the State.”168  She demanded that these rights 
“must work equally upon all citizens of the State,” concluding that 
“under this section of the Constitution she has a right to receive a license 
to practice law upon the same terms and conditions as the most favored 
citizen of the State of Illinois.”169  Three weeks later, Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton made similar arguments in her appeal for woman suffrage. 170 
 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Stanton spoke at the Joint Hearing before the District of D.C. Committees on January 22, 
1870.  PAPERS, supra note 74, at 296. 
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In her address to the Senate Committee on the District of Columbia 
on January 22, 1870, discussed above, Stanton incorporated New 
Departure textual interpretation arguments together with her use of pre-
sociological jurisprudence.171  She employed Francis Minor’s resolutions 
and argued that the right to vote was one of the privileges and 
immunities protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.172  Like Bradwell, 
she used the changed social and legal circumstance of women and the 
evolution of the Constitution to support her call for this broad 
interpretation.  Although both women lost their immediate appeals, their 
efforts introduced these new legal arguments into the public discourse.173  
Other women’s rights activists drew on their innovations in their 
continued fight for women’s civil and political rights. 
An example that garnered significant public attention occurred one 
year later, when Victoria Woodhull employed these two innovations in 
her argument to the United States Congress in support of woman 
suffrage.174  Although Woodhull had not previously worked with either 
Stanton or Bradwell, she echoed their arguments that the law must be 
interpreted in line with the evolving social and legal circumstances and 
specifically cited the advance in women’s property rights as evidence of 
such evolution.175  Woodhull also introduced the concept of justice as 
both evidence of social change and as a legitimate legislative goal, 
claiming that “the principle of justice and moral right ha[d] gained 
sway”176 and demanding the Congress interpret the existing 
Constitutional provisions in light of these advances and pass a 
declaratory act acknowledging women’s enfranchisement.177  Shortly 
after her appearance, Woodhull was plagued by scandal, and she was not 
able to continue to publicly advance her arguments.178  But her 
testimony had drawn considerable attention to the cause and others 
 
 171. Id. 
 172. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1480. 
 173. Id. at 1483. 
 174. GOLDSMITH, supra note 82 at 248-55. 
 175. Id. at 247; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1484; ROGERS M. SMITH, CIVIC IDEALS: 
CONFLICTING VISIONS OF CITIZENSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 338 (1997).  Woodhull was an outspoken 
supporter of free love and divorce, aligning her with Stanton and in opposition to Bradwell. 
GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 248-49.  It is not known whether Woodhull had either read or heard 
of Bradwell or Stanton’s arguments. 
 176. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1485 (quoting Victoria C. Woodhull’s testimony before the 
Judiciary Committees of the Senate and House of Representatives of the Congress of the United 
States). 
 177. GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 248; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1484, 1489. 
 178. GOLDSMITH, supra note 82, at 255; see Winkler, supra note 115, at 1520 n.383. 
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continued to employ these arguments, most prominently Susan B. 
Anthony.179 
Anthony used these arguments in her defense in the case of the 
United States v. Susan B. Anthony.180  Anthony had been charged with 
voting illegally.181  The judge presiding over Anthony’s case deemed her 
incompetent to testify because she was a woman.  Anthony, therefore, 
had her attorney, Henry Selden, speak for her.182  He set forth both the 
New Departure argument that called for a broad textual interpretation, 
and the pre-sociological jurisprudence argument that demanded that the 
court consider the changed social and legal circumstances in interpreting 
the law.183  Selden argued that evolution of society, and women’s 
position within it, supported women’s enfranchisement.184  Like 
Bradwell, Stanton, and Woodhull before him, Selden used the Married 
Women’s Property Acts to support women’s changed condition.185  He 
challenged the ideals of legal classicism and the use of originalism that 
required judges to discern the intent of the Framers and apply the law as 
if it were static.186  Like the others before him, Selden lost his case, but 
his arguments advanced the new methods of interpretation, which had 
for the first time been set forth by a man.187 
Bradwell’s direct influence is most visible in the arguments offered 
by other women lawyers who invoked her words in support of their own 
law license applications.  In the neighboring state of Wisconsin, Lavinia 
Goodell applied for a license to practice law before the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court in 1875.188  She offered a plethora of arguments invoking 
 
 179. See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829 (N.D.N.Y. 1873). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1506; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 159; 
SMITH, supra note 175, at 341. 
 182. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 653. 
 183. Id. at 657-58. 
 184. Id.; Winkler, supra note 115, at 1509. 
 185. 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 657-58. 
 186. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1511-12; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, 
at 667-68. 
 187. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1512, 1514; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 
144, at 691; FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 26, at 159-60; SMITH, supra note 175, at 341. 
Bradwell published the decision in Anthony’s case and then wrote two editorial notes criticizing the 
decision, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 21, 1873, at 466 and CHI. LEGAL NEWS, July 19, 1873, at 498. 
 188. See, e.g., Mrs. Lockwood’s Case, 11 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Nov. 16, 1878, at 70 (Bradwell’s 
publishing of Lockwood’s letter to Bradwell, the details of Lockwood’s case, and Bradwell’s 
commitment to support her; Lockwood’s letter pledging to finish the fight Bradwell started to allow 
women to practice law and asking for her help in her application to practice law in Maryland).  See 
infra notes 194-195 for Bradwell’s support of Goodell’s application to practice law in Wisconsin 
and Lockwood’s application to practice law before the United States Supreme Court. 
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notions of equality as well as gender difference (that she asserted would 
enhance women’s ability to practice law) 189 and interwove arguments 
that employed classical legal reasoning, the New Departure, and pre-
sociological jurisprudence arguments.190  She asserted that the 
Wisconsin legislature had not intended to exclude women when it 
enacted the state’s licensing regulations just five years earlier.  She 
explained that the laws were passed “when progressive ideas concerning 
the enlargement of the sphere of woman’s industries were more widely 
known and adopted”191 and reasoned that therefore  it “may reasonably 
be presumed to have been within the minds of the legislators” that 
women would be admitted.192  She also cited recently enacted laws that 
advanced the legal position of women, including the state’s Married 
Women’s Property Acts and the changes that had occurred since the 
Illinois Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bradwell’s case.193  
Goodell lost her initial suit, but the case received considerable attention, 
primarily because Chief Justice Ryan’s opinion articulated his horror of 
a woman in the same terms Justice Bradley had used two years earlier.194 
The following year, Belva Lockwood took women’s fight to 
practice law, and Bradwell’s arguments, back to the United States 
Supreme Court and to Congress.  She worked closely with Bradwell, 
who documented the events in the Chicago Legal News.195  Lockwood, 
who was already licensed to practice law in the District of Columbia, 
sought to be admitted to practice law before the United States Supreme 
Court. 196  She engaged the assistance of attorney Albert Riddle, a strong 
supporter of women’s rights who had used these new interpretation 
 
 189. See Catherine B. Cleary, Lavinia Goodell: First Woman Lawyer in Wisconsin, 74 WISC. 
MAG. OF HIST. 243 (1991).  See VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN 
MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 22-23 (1998). 
 190. Can a Woman Practice Law in Wisconsin?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 1, 1876, at 116. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See id. 
 194. See infra notes 252-255 and accompanying text.  In re Goodell 39 Wis. 232 (1875).  For 
contemporary discussions of the case see Should Women Practice Law in Wisconsin, 8 CHI. LEGAL 
NEWS 215 (March 25, 1876) (where Bradwell dissects Ryan’s opinion); Women as Lawyers--Mrs. 
Goodell’s Case, THE CENTRAL LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 24, 1876, at 186 (arguing that women should 
have the chance to practice law); Editorial Notes, INDEP., Mar. 23, 1876, at 16 (describing Ryan’s 
decision as “stupid, illiberal, and mean”). 
 195. See Shall Women Be Admitted to Practice Law in the Federal Courts?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, 
Mar. 23, 1878, at 215; Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 30, 1878, at 
224-25; The Admission of Women to the Bar, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb.15, 1879; Women as Lawyers, 
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 11, 1878, at 271-72; Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, CHI. 
LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 10, 1877, at 169. 
 196. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 31, 33. 
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arguments five years earlier while representing two women who 
unsuccessfully sued the District of Columbia Board of Electors for 
refusing to allow them to vote.197 
Lockwood invoked the new method of interpretation immediately 
in her response to her initial rejection by Chief Justice Morrison R. 
Waite.  Waite noted that only men had ever been admitted to the 
Supreme Court bar and therefore precedent barred her application.198  
Lockwood rejected his reasoning, asserting that “it was the glory of each 
generation to make its own precedents.”199  She then took her appeal to 
Congress. 
Lockwood drafted a bill that granted women the right to be 
admitted to practice law on the same grounds as men and argued that the 
changed social conditions and the current position of woman required its 
passage.200  In 1878, the House of Representatives passed the bill but it 
stalled in the Senate.201  She submitted a brief to the Senate encouraging 
it to act in accordance with the demands of the age: “This country is one 
that has not hesitated when the necessity has arisen to make precedents” 
she wrote, “the more extended practice and the more extended public 
opinion [supporting women lawyers] . . . has already been accomplished.  
Ah!  That very opinion . . . [is] asking you for that special act now so 
nearly consummated, which shall open this door of labor to women.”202  
California Senator Aaron Sargent, a longtime supporter of woman’s 
rights and a close friend of Susan B. Anthony’s, took up Lockwood’s 
fight.203 
Sargent followed Bradwell’s lead in his arguments to his fellow 
senators.  He claimed that women were citizens and then listed the social 
 
 197. Winkler, supra note 115, at 1497; 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, supra note 144, at 
587-94. 
 198. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 33; DRACHMAN, supra note 189, at 27; FAIRMAN, supra 
note 8, at 1366.  See also Jill Norgren, Before It Was Merely Difficult: Belva Lockwood’s Life in 
Law and Politics, 23 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 16, 29 (1999); Lee Ann Potter, A Bill to Relieve Certain 
Legal Disabilities of Women, 66 SOC. EDUC. 117, 119 (2002). 
 199. Frances A. Cook, Belva Ann Lockwood: For Peace, Justice, and President, May 13, 1997, 
available at http://stanford.edu/group/WLHP/papers/lockwood. 
 200. See Shall Women Be Admitted to the Bar?, supra note 195, at 225. 
 201. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34; see also Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, 
Mar. 2, 1878, at 191; Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, supra note 195, at 169. 
 202. Bella Lockwood, In Support of House Bill 1077, Entitled “A Bill to Relieve Certain 
Disabilities of Women,” in JAMES KIRBY, 1 THE LEGAL NEWS 185 (1878). 
 203. See MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34; Mrs. Lockwood’s Victory, supra note 197, at 91; 
Women’s Right to Practice in the U.S. Courts, supra note 195, at 169. 
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and legal evolutions that had advanced their condition.204  He invoked 
the names of accomplished women from a diversity of occupations and 
professions, including women lawyers.205  He cited the state laws that 
had advanced women’s legal rights, including the many states that 
already admitted women to their bars.206  He also submitted petitions 
signed by lawyers in both New York and the District of Columbia that 
supported women’s admission to the Supreme Court bar, which 
supported Lockwood’s claim that there was popular support for the 
bill.207  The Senate acquiesced and enacted the law in February 1879.208  
In a moment of great triumph, Lockwood was admitted to the Supreme 
Court bar on March 3, 1879.209 
B.  The Illinois and United States Supreme Court Decisions in 
Bradwell’s Case 
Bradwell lost her case at both the state and federal level.  The 
Illinois Supreme Court rejected the arguments she set forth in her three 
briefs.  The U.S. Supreme Court never even heard her arguments.  
Although Bradwell keenly suffered the defeat, these decisions did not 
dissuade the continued use and development of either the pre-
sociological arguments or the New Departure.  They were not even 
definitive on the issue of women securing their law licenses.  Rather, 
they represent both courts’ attempts to stay the evolution of democracy 
that was moving toward the demise of the ideology and practice of 
separate spheres. 
The Illinois Supreme Court discussed its fear of women’s progress 
in its opinion.  It first stated definitively that married or not, no woman 
could be admitted to the Illinois bar and summarily dismissed 
Bradwell’s constitutional claims.210  Then, it rested the decision on its 
horror of a woman.211  The court was acutely aware and openly afraid of 
 
 204. Women as Lawyers, supra note 195, at 272.  Throughout Sargent’s political and legal 
career, he was a champion of women’s rights.  A close friend of Susan B. Anthony’s, in 1878 he 
introduced the “Anthony Amendment” to Congress, the woman suffrage amendment that was 
ultimately enacted as the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.  FLEXNER & FITZPATRICK, supra note 
26, at 165. 
 205. See Women as Lawyers, supra note 195, at 272. 
 206. The Admission of Women to the Bar, supra note 195, at 181. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id.; 20 Stat. 292 (1879). 
 209. VIRGINIA G. DRACHMAN, WOMEN LAWYERS AND THE ORIGINS OF PROFESSIONAL 
IDENTITY IN AMERICA 243 (1993). 
 210. See A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147. 
 211. See id. 
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the woman’s rights movement’s quest for legal equality and the social 
upheaval that it believed would follow if the movement succeeded.  
Chief Justice Charles B. Lawrence explained that “this step [admitting 
Bradwell to the bar], if taken by us, would mean that, in the opinion of 
this tribunal, every civil office in this State may be filled by women; that 
it is in harmony with the spirit of our constitution and laws that women 
should be made governors, judges and sheriffs.  This we are not yet 
prepared to hold.”212  The court tried to put the matter to rest by adding, 
insincerely, “[i]f the legislature shall choose to remove the existing 
barriers and authorize us to issue licenses equally to men and women we 
shall cheerfully obey . . . .”213 
But there was growing support for women holding political office 
and working in the profession.  Within two years, the Illinois legislature 
removed its barriers.  The tide was turning and the justices felt it.  Their 
pronouncements were defensive attempts to hold off the tide, rather than 
reflections of the general consensus.  But the Illinois court dealt a 
significant blow to the movement and Bradwell understood this.  She 
described the court’s decision as a denial of women’s citizenship.  She 
charged, “what the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in 
the Dred Scott case was to the rights of negroes as citizens of the United 
States, this decision is to the political rights of women in Illinois – 
annihilation.”214  Bradwell then took her case to the U.S. Supreme 
Court.215 
Bradwell did not represent herself in her appeal.  Instead, she hired 
Matthew Carpenter, a well-known attorney, U.S. Senator, and woman 
suffrage supporter to argue her case to the United States Supreme 
Court.216  Bradwell wanted her case cast as a woman’s rights case and 
framed in the broadest terms.  She wanted the Supreme Court to rule that 
 
 212. In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869).  See also Olsen, supra note 6, at 1518-41. 
 213. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147.  In 
addition to the Bradwell case, Justice Lawrence received strong criticism in his opinion in The 
People vs. Charles L. Wilson and Andrew Shuman in 1875.  See 3 A[LFRED] T[HEODORE] 
ANDREAS, HISTORY OF CHICAGO, 1839-1900, at 252 (1975).  The proprietor and the editor of the 
Chicago Evening Journal had published a column criticizing the lax treatment murderers received 
in the criminal courts.  Id.  The Supreme Court issued contempt citations against them and had them 
arrested.  Id.  Chief Justice Lawrence found them in contempt and fined them $100 and $200 
respectively.  Id.  Newspapers throughout America and Europe commented negatively on the court's 
actions and Andreas wrote, “The action of Judge Lawrence in the case undoubtedly contributed to 
his defeat as a candidate for re-election to the Supreme Bench the following year.”  Id. 
 214. A Woman Cannot Practice Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, supra note 102, at 147; see 
also BUECHLER, supra note 39, at 64. 
 215. Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
 216. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 117. 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act established 
women as full citizens entitled to all rights, privileges, and obligations of 
citizenship and to the equal protection of the law.  But Carpenter did not 
comply with Bradwell’s intentions.  He did not consult with Bradwell 
prior to submitting his brief or presenting his oral argument before the 
Court.217 
Carpenter was also the attorney for the Crescent City Slaughter-
House company in Slaughter House Cases.218  He argued in the 
Slaughter-House case that the law granting the monopoly was proper 
under the state police power.219  In Bradwell’s case, he followed the 
argument of his opponent in the Slaughter-House case, former Supreme 
Court Justice John Campbell, and argued that the right to work, which he 
labeled the liberty of pursuit, was one of the fundamental rights included 
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.220  He did not present Bradwell’s argument that the Illinois 
court’s denial of her law license violated the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment or the 1866 Civil Rights Act.  Carpenter 
determined not to make any arguments based on gender equality and 
went so far as to differentiate the right to work from the right to vote.221  
He blatantly argued against the New Departure and claimed that the 
right to vote was a political right, not a privilege and immunity protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.222 
Bradwell never commented publicly on Carpenter’s concession that 
the right to vote was not included in the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship.  She instead published Carpenter’s argument in full in the 
Chicago Legal News and described it generally as an “able, concise, and 
unanswerable argument.”223  Leaders of the suffrage movement, were 
not so cavalier.  Matilda Joslyn Gage wrote an editorial to the Chicago 
Tribune and described as “inconsistent” and “befogging” Carpenter’s 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment granted women civil equality 
but not political equality.224  Anthony wrote a personal letter to Bradwell 
 
 217. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 119.  Bradwell did, nonetheless, praise Carpenter’s argument on 
her behalf.  Senator Carpenter’s Argument – Liberty of Pursuit, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 
108. 
 218. E. BRUCE THOMPSON, MATTHEW HALE CARPENTER: WEBSTER OF THE WEST 101 (1954). 
 219. See Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872); THOMPSON, supra note 218, at 101. 
 220. Smith, supra note 8, at 260. 
  221. HOFF, supra note 8, at 168-69; Gilliam, supra note 8.  See also DuBois, supra note 13, at 
19-40. 
 222. Supreme Court of the United States, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Jan. 20, 1872, at 108-09. 
 223. Senator Carpenter’s Argument – Liberty of Pursuit, supra note 217. 
 224. The Political Aspect of the Question, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 8, 1872, at 5. 
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describing Carpenter’s arguments as “such a school boy pettifogging 
speech . . . wholly without basic principle” but she conceded “still the 
courts are so entirely controlled by prejudice and precedent we have 
nothing to hope from them but endorsement of dead men’s actions.”225  
Perhaps Bradwell remained silent on the point because she understood 
the difficulties of crafting an argument that would persuade the Justices. 
The U.S. Supreme Court took three years to render its ruling in 
Bradwell’s case.  When it did, it ruled against Bradwell, basing its 
opinion on the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.226  The Court made its decision in Slaughter-House Cases 
first, and then applied its reasoning to Bradwell.227  When the majority 
opinion by Justice Miller was read in open court – a decision which 
discussed its Constitutional grounds but abstained from any comment of 
the issue of women’s rights – there was no notable reaction by the 
audience in the courtroom.  In contrast, when Justice Bradley’s 
concurring opinion was read, with its emphasis on separate spheres and 
women’s place, one reporter described that “it seemed to cause no little 
amusement upon the bench and the bar.”228  The audience apparently 
considered Justice Bradley’s horror of a woman comical. 
Bradwell offered her own assessment of the Court’s decision in the 
Chicago Legal News.  She respectfully disagreed with the majority’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment – both in determining its 
construction and in its definition of the privileges and immunities of 
citizens – but she was livid at Bradley’s concurrence.  She pointed out 
the inconsistency between his dissent in Slaughter-House Cases and his 
concurrence in her case.  “If, as Justice Bradley says, the liberty of 
pursuit is one of the fundamental privileges of an American citizen,” she 
asked, “how can he then, and be consistent, deprive an American citizen 
of the right to follow any calling or profession under laws, rules and 
regulations that shall operate equally upon all, simply because such 
citizen is a woman?”229  She posited that he “lower[ed] the dignity” of 
his office “by traveling out of the record to give his individual views 
upon what we commonly term ‘Woman’s Rights.’”230  The public 
 
 225. FRIEDMAN, supra note 13, at 185 (emphasis deleted) (letter from Anthony to Bradwell 
dated June 30, 1873). 
 226. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 116; SMITH, supra note 175, at 339-41. 
 227. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872). 
 228. More Supreme Court Decisions, BOSTON DAILY ADVERTISER, Apr. 16, 1873, at 1; 
Gilliam, supra note 8, at 126; WARREN, supra note 8, at 550. 
 229. The XIV Amendment and Our Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 10, 1873, at 390. 
 230. Id. 
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response to Bradwell’s case and to other women lawyers suggests that 
Bradwell was not alone in her assessment. 
IV.  POPULAR SUPPORT FOR CHALLENGES TO THE DOCTRINE OF 
SEPARATE SPHERES 
The Supreme Court and a number of state courts resisted various 
women’s claims for legal equality and, specifically, their attempts to 
become licensed attorneys.231  But Supreme Court decisions do not 
always or necessarily represent public sentiment on the specific issue in 
dispute or those underlying it.  In the case of women’s fight for legal 
equality, and specifically women’s right to practice law, the Supreme 
Court lagged behind a more progressive public sentiment.  There were 
some state courts and legislatures that granted women rights, including 
the right to practice law, even as Justice Bradley pronounced that it was 
a violation of divine and natural law.232  And there was evidence of 
significant public support for the women who sought to enter the 
profession.233 
The first evidence of public support for women’s foray into the 
legal profession accompanied Arabella Mansfield’s admission, the first 
woman who secured a state law license.234  Mansfield had the support of 
a number of members of the Iowa bar, including the male lawyers who 
administered her bar examination.235  They passed her with high honors 
and lauded her skill, noting that “in her examination, she has given the 
very best rebuke possible to the imputation that ladies can not qualify for 
the practice of law.”236  They further remarked on the changed social 
circumstances that, they asserted, required her admission.  They 
explained that they construed the Iowa statute controlling the admission 
of attorneys to include women despite its use of the word “male” as a 
response to “the demands and necessities of the present time and 
occasion.”237 
 
 231. Nineteen state courts refused to admit grant women a license to practice law without an 
act from their legislatures.  DRACHMAN, supra note 189, at app. 1 (listing the date of admission of 
the first woman lawyer in each state and the District of Columbia and whether the admission was 
approved by the state court or if an act of the state legislature was required to overcome the court’s 
refusal to admit women to its bar). 
 232. See id. 
 233. See infra notes 234-249 and accompanying text. 
 234. See Thomas, supra note 97, at 492. 
 235. Id. at 493. 
 236. Ellen Martin, Admission of Women to the Bar, 1 CHI. L. TIMES 76, 76-77 (1887) (quoting 
the Examining Committee Report). 
 237. Id. at 76. 
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Support for Mansfield also appeared to extend beyond the activists 
that enabled her admission.  The lawyers who examined her claimed that 
the committee’s support for Mansfield was representative of all the 
lawyers in the state.  “[W]e feel confident . . . ,” they explained, “that we 
speak not only the sentiments of the court and of your committee, but the 
entire members of the bar, when we say that we heartily welcome Mrs. 
Mansfield as one of our members, and most cordially recommend her 
admission.”238  Further evidence of public support was set forth in the 
local newspaper, which asserted that Mansfield is a “lady of strong 
mind.  That she has the brain and the necessary ability to make a good 
record for herself no one will dispute.”239  As the number of women 
lawyers grew, so it appears did the public’s approval of their endeavors. 
Those who supported women lawyers attempted to answer the two 
greatest concerns expressed by those, like Justice Bradley, who 
championed the doctrine of separate spheres.  They argued that women 
were intellectually capable of professional pursuits.  Simultaneously, 
they insisted that working outside of the domestic sphere would neither 
make the women unfeminine nor destroy the family.  Therefore, a 
number of papers that reported on Mansfield’s admission described her 
as “the grace and beauty of the Iowa bar.”240 
Alta Hulett had similar public support in Illinois in the early 1870s.  
Even before she applied for her license, a local reporter had noticed her 
monitoring proceedings at the courthouse. 241  The paper described her in 
a way that was supportive of her ambitions and reassuring to those who 
feared women’s rights would upset the social order.  It observed she was 
“a charming young lady . . . of more than ordinary personal attractions 
bright and prepossessing in appearance, and evidently in earnest in her 
purpose to acquire a profession.”242  It suggested that she would make a 
competent lawyer by assessing that as she sat in the courtroom she “was 
 
 238. A Woman Lawyer at Last, NEWARK ADVOCATE (Newark, OH), July 9 1869, at 1, col. H; 
The Athens of Iowa Ahead, MORNING REPUBLICAN (Little Rock, AR), July 14, 1869, at col. A. 
 239. A Married Woman, supra note 101, at 20 (quoting from the Mount Pleasant Journal); 
DAILY NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER & WASHINGTON EXPRESS (Washington, D.C.), Oct. 26, 1869, at 
col. H. 
 240. Personal and General, FRANK LESLIE’S ILLUSTRATED NEWSPAPER (New York, NY), 
Nov. 27, 1869, at 171, col. C; All Sorts and Sizes, BANGOR DAILY WHIG & COURIER (Bangor, ME), 
Nov. 13, 1869, at col. F; see also THE NEWS AND OBSERVER (Raleigh, NC), Aug. 16, 1892, at col. 
A (discussing Mansfield being admitted to the bar); Notes, THE DAILY INTER OCEAN (Chicago, IL), 
Aug. 27, 1892, at 11, col. B; Current Comment, ST. PAUL DAILY NEWS, Aug. 30, 1892, at 4, col. C; 
America’s Female Lawyers, THE ATCHISON DAILY GLOBE (Atchison, KS), Sept. 20, 1892, col. E. 
 241. See GA WEEKLY TELEGRAPH & GA JOURNAL & MESSENGER, Nov. 15, 1870, at col. D 
(reprinting an article from the ROCKFORD REGISTER). 
 242. Id. 
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watching the progress of a case with as much interest as any of the legal 
gentlemen present.”243 
After Hulett passed the bar but was denied a license, newspapers 
around the country covered her story.  They cited her ability without any 
criticism or objections and with an undertone of support.244  A New 
Hampshire paper described the Illinois court as out of step with the 
modern times, noting “[t]he ‘old fogy’ Judges of the Illinois Supreme 
Court have [now] refused two applications of females [Bradwell and 
Hulett] to be admitted to the bar of that State.”245  Local newspapers 
increased their support for Hulett when she, with the support of Myra 
Bradwell and others, drafted a state law that would open all professions 
to women.246 
Alta Hulett increased her popular support by lecturing throughout 
the state in support of the bill.  She crafted an address entitled “Justice 
versus the Supreme Court” outlining the issues in her case that included 
a general demand for equality between the sexes and a specific demand 
that women be granted the right to practice law.247  She debuted her 
lecture in her hometown in northern Illinois where the crowds were 
overflowing and cheered often throughout her speech.248  One local 
paper was so impressed with Hulett it exclaimed “[s]he is an honor to 
Rockford.”249 
These displays of support for the early women lawyers by members 
of their local communities and some members of the bar are not 
evidence that the ideology of separate spheres had been overthrown, but 
they do suggest that there was growing opposition to its constraints.  As 
one newspaper described, women’s efforts to practice law were “a new 
 
 243. Id. 
 244. See Personal, THE MILWAUKEE SENTINEL, Nov. 10, 1871, at col. C. 
 245. THE DAILY PATRIOT (Concord, NH), Nov. 23, 1871, at col. B. 
 246. The law they drafted in the fall of 1871, was “[a]n act to secure to all persons freedom in 
the selection of occupation, profession or employment.”  S. 275, 27th Sess., at 1024-1026 (Ill. 
1872). 
 247. Alta Hulett first delivered her address on November 25, 1871 in Rockford’s Brown Hall 
to a capacity crowd.  Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD JOURNAL, Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; Miss 
Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, Dec. 2, 1871, at 1; Miss Hulett’s Lecture, 
ROCKFORD GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 1871. 
 248. Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, supra note 247, at 1 (reporting that 
the night of Hulett’s debut the Hall was “filled to its utmost capacity . . . [with] not a foot of 
standing room unoccupied” and that “over four hundred persons went away unable to get inside”); 
Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD JOURNAL, supra note 247, at 2 (reporting that Hulett 
“spoke for an hour and a half and during the whole time she held [the audience’s] strict attention 
and drew from them repeated rounds of applause.”). 
 249. Miss Alta M. Hulett’s Lecture, ROCKFORD REGISTER, supra note 247, at 1. 
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and most interesting phase of the great battle now raging along the entire 
of society between Progress and Prescription.”250  There were those that 
would never change their minds.  Even after women were admitted to 
the bar, many members of the bench continued to oppose the idea of 
women practicing law.  According to Myra Bradwell, after Alta Hulett 
was admitted to the bar in 1873, one of the Illinois Supreme Court 
judges acknowledged “that she had passed a good examination” but 
remarked “if she were his daughter, he would disinherit her.”251  
Bradwell described his position as representative of the sentiment among 
some of the older members of the profession and resigned that 
“[n]othing save a blast from Gabriel’s trumpet can dispel these lifelong 
prejudices.”252  But that judge, rather than representing the dominant 
sentiment in Illinois, was speaking out against the changes that were 
taking place. 
Reactions to Myra Bradwell’s case by the press and members of the 
bar offered additional support for the changing public sentiment on the 
condition of women.  First, as Nancy Gilliam has noted, the State of 
Illinois did not present any case in opposition to Bradwell’s appeal.  It 
did not submit a brief to the Supreme Court supporting the Illinois 
Supreme Court’s decision nor did it send a representative to the oral 
arguments.  Although Gilliam claims there is some precedent for this, “it 
was not customary for a state to treat a suit so cavalierly.”253  
Additionally, there was the single sentence written by a reporter for the 
Boston Daily Advertiser that noted that Justice Bradley’s opinion, 
describing woman as unfit to practice law and championing separate 
spheres, “seemed to cause no little amusement upon the bench and in the 
bar.”254  The implication is that Bradley’s position was so out of step 
with the current sentiment the audience laughed at his concurring 
opinion. 
Editorial comments in a number of newspapers offer further 
evidence that there was a growing sector that disagreed with Bradley.  
The Chicago Tribune claimed that Bradwell had the skills and intellect 
to be an attorney255 and described Bradley as “cling[ing] to the old idea 
 
 250. A Feminine Dred Scott Case, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 10, 1870, at 4. 
 251. Deep-Rooted Prejudice, 5 CHI. LEGAL NEWS, June 14, 1873, at 453. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Gilliam, supra note 8, at 123. 
 254. More Supreme Court Decisions, supra note 228, at 1. 
 255. The Myra Bradwell Case, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 20, 1873, at 8. 
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of woman’s sphere in life . . . .”256  Another report, written while the 
case was on appeal before Bradley rendered his concurrence, praised 
Bradwell for her efforts and expressed its opinion that public sentiment 
was on her side:  “Mrs. Bradwell has done well to push her claims . . . 
[and w]e have not the least doubt that the next legislature of Illinois will 
remove the grievance under which this accomplished woman, and all her 
sisters in that state, now suffer.”257 
Lavinia Goodell, like the other women lawyers, also received 
significant support for her professional efforts in local and national 
newspapers.  When she was first admitted to practice law in Janesville, 
Wisconsin, a Milwaukee paper noted the occasion and offered its 
support.  It attempted to calm any horror of a woman fears its readers 
might have by editorializing that Goodell “possesses a pleasing and 
modest address.”  It also affirmed that she had sufficient “intellectual 
vigor to rank among the foremost of her profession.”258  Other 
newspapers across the country noted the event without editorial, but 
without any negative undercurrent.259 
Goodell also received broad public support after Chief Justice Ryan 
denied her application in an opinion that closely followed Justice 
Bradley’s position.260  Wisconsin attorney Ole Mosness published an 
editorial in the Wisconsin State Journal criticizing the court’s 
decision.261  The Wisconsin press called the decision unjust and 
predicted that, “[t]here will be very decided dissenting opinions 
 
 256. Woman’s Right to Practice Law, CHI. DAILY  TRIB., May 11, 1873, at 8.  Note that there 
were some who did not support separate spheres but were critical of Bradwell and the woman’s 
movement for bringing this case when it was apparent that they would lose.  WARREN, supra note 8, 
at 550 n.1 (quoting THE NATION, Apr. 24, 1873).  See also Women Practice in the Courts – A Test 
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,1873, at 1 (reprinting an article from the Chicago Journal which was 
published before the Supreme Court rendered its decision, offering support for Bradwell’s argument 
that women are citizens and can practice law). 
 257. A Feminine Dred Scott Case, supra note 250, at 4. 
 258. Admitted to Practice, MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, June 19, 1874, at 5, col. C; see also 
THE GALVESTON DAILY NEWS, July 23, 1874, at col. D (noting that Goodell “is said to be a lady of 
good education, fine appearance, and modest bearing”). 
 259. About Women, LOWELL DAILY CITIZEN AND NEWS (Lowell, MA), June 29, 1874, at col. 
C; General Intelligence, BOSTON INVESTIGATOR, July 8, 1874, at 6, col. D; Personalities, 
CLEVELAND DAILY HERALD, July 3, 1874, at 4, col. F (noting Goodell was admitted “after passing 
a very creditable examination”). 
 260. See In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 244-45 (1875); see also Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 11, 1876, at 196, 199. 
 261. See Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Mar. 4, 1876, at 191 
(reprinting the Wisconsin State Journal article); see also Mr. Mosness on Judge Ryan’s Opinion, 
CHI. LEGAL NEWS, May 13, 1876, at 271 (letter by Mosness to Bradwell arguing that the Chief 
Justice of the Wisconsin court’s “prejudice against women in the practice of law” influenced him to 
“disregard the plain provision of the statute”). 
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expressed by members of the bar and by the people . . . .” 262  A 
Milwaukee paper explained that Ryan denied Goodell’s application 
based on a “law that is about a thousand years old.”  And finally, the 
Journal contended that if practicing law would place women’s purity in 
danger, “it would be better to reconstruct the court and the bar, than to 
exclude the women.”263 
When Goodell subsequently reapplied for admission to the 
Wisconsin State Supreme Court bar, after she secured a new law that 
allowed women to be admitted,264 newspapers again offered their 
support for Goodell and for women’s rights in general.  One editorial 
despaired at the lingering prejudices that existed within the judiciary.  
“The prejudice of sex is the most imbecile, the least excusable, of all 
prejudices – and yet it is one of the strongest.” 265  This author perceived 
the prejudice against women as persistent and pervasive: “the 
intolerance of woman workers in the fields assumed to be out of their 
sphere is as bitter and almost widespread as ever.”266  And yet, the 
author’s own position and the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s subsequent 
admission of Goodell (Ryan was the sole dissenter), suggest that the 
prejudice had lessened. 
Public support for women lawyers increased throughout the decade.  
By 1877 The New York World published an article encouraging women 
to practice law, especially in the Federal Courts.267  It cited Alta Hulett 
and Phoebe Couzins, a lawyer practicing in St. Louis, as examples of 
women “who have succeeded fairly, as well as men of equal mental 
caliber would have done, and this without ceasing to be womanly.”268  
The “womanly” qualifier reflects the opposition Myra Bradwell faced 
 
 262. Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, supra note 261, at 191; see also Female Lawyers, 
MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Feb. 24, 1876, at 7, col. A (reprinting Ryan’s opinion without 
textual editorial, but revealing its support for Goodell in its extended headline which reads “Female 
Lawyers.  Opinion of Chief Justice Ryan in the Case of Miss Lavinia Goodell.  The Reasons for 
Refusing Her Application to the Bar.  Law That Is About a Thousand Years Old”). 
 263. Miss Goodell’s Application Denied, supra note 261, at 191.  In 1877, with the support of 
every lawyer in her county, Goodell secured a law that prohibited sex as grounds for denying a law 
license.  See Cleary, supra note 189, at 265. 
 264. Cleary, supra note 189, at 265 (describing Goodell’s bill prohibiting the denial of a state 
law license on the basis of sex and its enactment on March 22, 1877).  Goodell reapplied for her law 
license in the spring of 1879.  Id. at 267. 
 265. MILWAUKEE DAILY SENTINEL, Apr. 25, 1879, at 4, col. B (discussing Lavinia Goodell’s 
application to the bar). 
 266. Id. 
 267. INTER OCEAN (Chicago, IL), Jan. 31, 1877, at 4, col. F (summarizing article from NEW 
YORK WORLD). 
 268. Id. 
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when some, like Justice Bradley, claimed that a woman attorney would 
violate the natural order.  The World strongly supported women leaving 
the domestic sphere and entering the public one.  “There can be no 
earthly reason,” it continued “why women should not be admitted to 
compete with men in any occupation for which they are fitted . . . .”269 
By the 1890s, papers throughout the country commented on the 
increase in the number of women lawyers.  They particularly noted that 
there were several women practicing who were members of the Supreme 
Court Bar.  A newspaper in Bismark, North Dakota described these 
accomplishments and then editorialized, “[i]n a single decade the 
number of women lawyers increased from one to seventy-five.”270  None 
of the papers expressed any opposition or even discussed the issue of 
separate spheres; rather, there was a suggestion of pride in the way 
society had progressed.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Myra Bradwell lost her appeal, but the Supreme Court decision in 
Bradwell v. Illinois should not historically negate the innovations she 
forged through her case.  Each act Bradwell took in the process – from 
her initial application, her briefs to the Illinois Supreme Court, her 
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, and her prolific editorials on every 
aspect of her case and the cases of others – brought attention to the legal 
issues, garnered significant popular support for the cause, and advanced 
the women’s rights movement.  Through her legal arguments, she also 
initiated two legal innovations that became important tools in the fight 
for rights: crafting the foundations of sociological jurisprudence and 
forging the argument that the Equal Protection Clause should be applied 
to women.  She drew on the ideas and assistance of other women’s rights 
activists, men and women, to develop these innovations, and encouraged 
others to continue the fight.  Over the subsequent century, the women’s 
rights movement developed and implemented the arguments Bradwell 
initiated in her case.  Their legacy, however, (and perhaps, of course) 
was mixed. 
The evolution of Bradwell’s early sociological jurisprudence 
arguments is complicated.  Many scholars have identified Florence 
Kelley’s work at Hull House in Chicago and as the executive director of 
the National Consumers League in New York to advance protective 
 
 269. Id. 
 270. Woman Lawyers, BISMARCK DAILY TRIB., June 20, 1891, at 2, col. D. 
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labor legislation as a significant contribution to the development of 
sociological jurisprudence.271  Kelley first initiated these reforms for 
women and children with the intention of then expanding their 
protections to male laborers.  As Rogers Smith explains, efforts to secure 
“protection for all and [maintain] a consistent, egalitarian liberal 
feminism, [had] proved to be inadequate, but there [was] no doubt that 
conditions of working women did urgently demand improvement.”272  
Kelley and her colleague Josephine Goldmark developed the idea of 
using current economic and sociological evidence to enact laws that 
would limit the hours women laborers could be required to work, 
establish a minimum wage, and establish health and safety requirements 
for conditions in the workplace. Together they gathered the evidence and 
drafted the document that became known as the Brandeis brief.  They 
convinced Louis Brandeis to argue their case before the U.S. Supreme 
Court and won a victory when the Court upheld Oregon’s ten-hour work 
day law in Muller v. Oregon.273  Roscoe Pound later labeled this strategy 
as sociological jurisprudence.274 
Part of this strategy initially required arguing that laboring women 
needed special protections, drawing on the old notions of women’s 
delicacy.  This appeared to be inconsistent with women’s rights 
activists’ demands for legal equality.  Scholars continue to debate the 
cost and effectiveness of these reforms and the damage they did to the 
women’s rights campaign.275  These laws were at the heart of the second 
major split in the women’s movement in the 1920s when protective 
 
 271. HELENE SILVERBERG, GENDER AND AMERICAN SOCIAL SCIENCE: THE FORMATIVE 
YEARS 13-14 (1998); Felice Batlan, Law and the Fabric of the Everyday: The Settlement Houses, 
Sociological Jurisprudence, and the Gendering of Urban Legal Culture, 15 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 
235 (2006); Ira Harkavy & John L. Puckett, Lessons from Hull House for the Contemporary Urban 
University, 68 SOC. SERVICE REV.299 (Sep., 1994); Andrew R. Timming, Florence Kelley: A 
Recognition of Her Contributions to Sociology, 4 J. CLASSICAL SOC. 289 (Nov. 2004). 
 272. Smith, supra note 8, at 270. 
 273. 208 U.S. 412 (1908); Susan D. Carle, Gender in the Construction of the Lawyer’s 
Persona, 22 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 239, 245 (1999); Ronald K.L. Collins & Jennifer Friesen, 
Looking Back on Muller v. Oregon, 69 A.B.A. J. 294 (1983).  After the Nineteenth Amendment was 
enacted in 1920 granting women suffrage, the Supreme Court insincerely found that women no 
longer needed protective laws and maximum hours laws for women.  Adkins v. Children’s Hospital. 
261 U.S. 525 (1923); see I DISSENT 127 (Mark Tushnet ed., 2008); Smith, supra note 8, at 276.  But 
see Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292 (1924) (upholding a law that prohibited women in New York 
from working after 10 pm until 6 am); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) 
(upholding a minimum wage for women, recognizing for the first time that laborers were not on an 
equal standing with employers in negotiating a contract for labor). 
 274. See supra notes 138-139 and accompanying text. 
 275. JUDITH A. BAER, THE CHAINS OF PROTECTION: THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE TO WOMEN’S 
LABOR LEGISLATION 66 (1978). 
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legislation proponents bitterly fought with Alice Paul and the proponents 
of her proposed Equal Rights Amendment.276  They were also in conflict 
with women who brought claims of sex discrimination based on the 
Equal Protection clause.277 
But there were others who followed Bradwell’s example and used 
evidence of women’s social advances to support arguments for sex 
equality.  In the 1880s and 1890s other women lawyers used Bradwell’s 
argument about the changing social circumstances and position of 
women to secure entrance to other state bars and, as discussed, Belva 
Lockwood and her supporters used the argument to secure the 1879 
federal law that allowed women lawyers to practice in the federal 
courts.278  Additionally, some women activists employed the strategy to 
fight for criminal laws and procedures that would protect women’s 
bodies from physical and sexual abuse.279  In the twentieth century, 
women lawyers including Catharine Waugh McCulloch and Dorothy 
Kenyon used these arguments in their campaigns for women jury 
service.280 
The Supreme Court considered only a very few cases in which 
women made a claim of sex discrimination based on the Equal 
Protection Clause in the century after Bradwell.281  The Supreme Court’s 
decision in Slaughter-House Cases that the Equal Protection Clause was 
limited to ensuring the rights of African Americans stunted women’s 
initial invocation of the clause.  But the Court abandoned that distinction 
in its decisions on sex discrimination claims in the twentieth century.  
During the first half of the century, the Court rejected claims of sex 
discrimination based on the Equal Protection Clause by claiming that 
discrimination based on sex was not arbitrary, but rational, because men 
and women weren’t equal.  As Justice Holmes explained in Quong Wing 
 
 276. Mary Becker, The Sixties Shift to Formal Equality and the Courts: An Argument for 
Pragmatism and Politics, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 209, 212, 214-16 (1998). 
 277. Id. at 222-29. 
 278. MORELLO, supra note 4, at 34-35. 
 279. Elizabeth Pleck, Feminist Responses to “Crimes Against Women, 1868-1896,” 8 SIGNS 
451 (1983). 
 280. For a description of Dorothy Kenyon and her work and arguments for woman jury 
service, see SUSAN M. HARTMANN, THE OTHER FEMINISTS: ACTIVISTS IN THE LIBERAL 
ESTABLISHMENT 58-61 (1998); LINDA KERBER, NO CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES: 
WOMEN AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF CITIZENSHIP 169-70  (1998).  For a description of Catherine 
Waugh McCulloch’s work and arguments for woman jury service, see Catherine Waugh 
McCulloch, “Trial by Jury,” The Woman Citizen (Oct. 2, 1920), at 488; Gretchen Ritter, Jury 
Service and Women’s Citizenship Before and After the Nineteenth Amendment, 20 LAW HIST. REV. 
479 (2002). 
 281. I DISSENT, supra note 273, at 127. 
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v. Kirkendall, “the 14th Amendment does not interfere [with a law that 
makes a distinction in sex by placing a lighter burden on women than 
men] by creating a fictitious equality where there is a real difference.”282 
But there were those who disagreed, including women lawyers and 
an occasional dissenting Supreme Court Justice.  In his dissent in Quong 
Wing, Justice Joseph Lamar argued that the Montana law that imposed a 
tax on men that did hand laundry work but exempted women, was an 
arbitrary distinction.283  He wrote, “[t]he individual characteristics of the 
owner do not furnish a basis on which to make a classification for 
purposes of taxation.”284  Justice Rutledge made a similar argument in 
his dissent in Goesaert v. Cleary in 1948, asserting that since the 
Michigan law “arbitrarily discriminate[d] between male and female 
owners of liquor establishments,” it was a denial of equal protection.285 
The sex equality decisions by Congress and the Supreme Court 
during the second half of the twentieth century are well-studied.286  In 
1963, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act that prohibited sex 
discrimination in federal salaries.287  In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act that made it illegal for an employer to 
discriminate on the basis of sex.  In 1972, Congress passed Title IX of 
the Education Amendments that prohibited sex discrimination in 
education programs that received federal funds and the Equal Rights 
Amendment, although it failed ratification.  In 1971, the Supreme Court 
began to apply the Equal Protection Clause to overturn legislation that 
arbitrarily discriminated on the basis of sex,288 although it continues to 
 
 282. 223 U.S. 59, 63 (1912); see Smith, supra note 8, at 272 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment 
did not require imposing ‘a fictitious equality where there is a real difference.’” (quoting Quong 
Wing, 223 U.S. at 63)).  See also Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261 (1947); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 
U.S. 464 (1948); Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). 
 283. 223 U.S. 59, 64 (1911) (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
 284. Id. at 64-65 (Lamar, J., dissenting). 
 285. 335 U.S. 464, 468 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). 
 286. See Leslie W. Gladstone, Women’s Issues in Congress: Selected Legislation 1832-1998, 
in WOMEN AND WOMEN’S ISSUES IN CONGRESS 11 (Janet V. Lewis ed., 2000) (listing and 
describing federal laws that granted women rights though the nineteenth and twentieth centuries). 
 287. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
206 90d (2000)).  See also CYNTHIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S 
ISSUES, 1945-1968, at 899 (1988). 
 288. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (finding a statute that required a preference 
for a male administrator for a decedent’s estate was an equal protection violation); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (finding denial of housing and medical benefits to the families of 
female military officers was an equal protection violation). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 
Constitutional Adjudication in the United States as a Means of Advancing the Equal Stature of Men 
and Women Under the Law, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 263, 267-68 (1997). 
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debate what level of scrutiny to use in evaluating such laws.289  Many 
scholars argue that despite these decisions, sex inequality persists.290 
Myra Bradwell’s case and legacy is not a story of great victory, but 
neither is it one of great defeat. 
 
 
 289. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (introducing intermediate scrutiny as a midpoint 
between strict scrutiny and a rational basis standard); United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) 
(applying a stronger “skeptical scrutiny” standard); Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal 
Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 761, 827-34 (2004) (arguing the 
feminist strategy to use the Equal Protection Clause to secure equality and the Court’s interpretation 
of that clause limited the content of the equality).  See also Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender 
and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001) (arguing 
that although the ERA was never ratified, the amendment, nonetheless, influenced the judges to 
interpret the Fourteenth Amendment in a frame of formal equality rather than a substantive one). 
 290. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN (1979); 
Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law Male?, TRIAL, Aug. 1995, at 18; Lynn Hecht Schafran, Is the Law 
Male?: Let Me Count the Ways, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 397 (1993); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, 
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); Leslie 
Bender, Is Tort Law Male?: Foreseeability Analysis and Property Managers’ Liability for Third 
Party Rapes of Residents, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 313 (1993); Sylvia A. Law and Patricia 
Hennessey, Is the Law Male?: The Case of Family Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 354 (1993); Dorothy 
E. Roberts, Rape, Violence, and Women’s Autonomy, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 359 (1993); Sarah E. 
Burns, Is the Law Male?: The Role of Experts, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 389 (1993). 
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